CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Conference on Disarmament submits to the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly its annual report on its 1993 session, together with the pertinent documents and records.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

A. 1993 Session of the Conference

2. The Conference was in session from 19 January to 26 March, 10 May to 25 June and 26 July to 3 September 1993. During this period, the Conference held 30 formal plenary meetings, at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions set forth their views and recommendations on the various questions before the Conference.

3. The Conference also held 10 informal meetings on its agenda, programme of work, organization and procedures, as well as on items of its agenda and other matters.

4. In accordance with rule 9 of the rules of procedure, the following member States assumed successively the Presidency of the Conference: Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba and Egypt also for the recess until the 1994 session of the Conference.

B. Participants in the Work of the Conference

5. Representatives of the following member States participated in the work of the Conference: Algeria; Argentina; Australia; Belgium; Brazil; Bulgaria; Canada; China; Cuba; Egypt; Ethiopia; France; Germany; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Islamic Republic of Iran; Italy; Japan; Kenya; Mexico; Mongolia; Morocco; Myanmar; Netherlands; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Sri Lanka; Sweden; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; United States of America; Venezuela and Zaire.

C. Agenda and Programme of Work for the 1993 Session

6. At the 637th plenary meeting on 21 January 1993, the President read out a statement on the agenda and programme of work for the 1993 session in conformity with the rules of procedure. The text of the Presidential statement (CD/1180) reads as follows:

"(1) There is an understanding in the Conference that, at the outset of its 1993 session, the Conference decides to adopt as its agenda the agenda of its 1992 session, while noting that its ongoing consultations on the review of this agenda will be intensified:

1. Nuclear test ban

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters

4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons

7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament

8. Transparency in armaments

9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

"(2) The Conference further agrees, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to begin its work immediately on: 'Nuclear Test Ban', 'Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space', 'Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons' and 'Transparency in Armaments'. For this purpose, the Conference establishes Ad Hoc Committees on these items with the following mandates:

- Nuclear Test Ban: the result of the 1992 consultations conducted by the special coordinator on this item (CD/1179);

- Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: document CD/1125;

- Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons: document CD/1121;

- Transparency in Armaments: the decision of the Conference on 26 May 1992 (document CD/1150).

"(3) The Conference also recalls its decision to intensify its consultations on its improved and effective functioning, including its decision to carry out consultations on the issues of its membership and agenda. For this purpose, I confirm that I shall appoint two Special Coordinators to conduct consultations on the issues of membership and agenda.

"Lastly, I understand that it is the intention of interested members to continue their ongoing open-ended informal consultations on non-proliferation in all its aspects."

7. In accordance with the Presidential statement, at the 639th plenary meeting on 28 January 1993 the President of the Conference announced that he had decided to appoint, as Special Coordinator for the issue of membership, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, and for the question of the agenda, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico.

8. On 13 August 1993, the Special Coordinator for the question of the agenda reported to the Conference as follows:

> "Bearing in mind the relevant paragraphs of CD/1184 and the imminent expansion of the Conference's composition, it was agreed to continue the consultations regarding the agenda of the Conference during the 1994 session."

D. Attendance and Participation of States not members of the Conference

9. In conformity with rule 32 of the rules of procedure, the States non-members of the Conference listed under the following paragraph attended its plenary meetings.

10. The Conference received and considered requests for participation in its work from States not members of the Conference. In accordance with the rules of procedure and its decision taken at its 1990 session on its improved and effective functioning (CD/1036), the Conference invited the following non-member States to participate in the work of the Conference: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. The Conference noted the specific requests from some of these non-members.

E. Expansion of the membership of the Conference

11. The urgency attached to the question of the expansion of its membership was duly recognized by the Conference.

12. Requests for membership had been received, since 1982, from the following non-members, in chronological order: Norway, Finland, Austria, Turkey, Senegal, Bangladesh, Spain, Viet Nam, Ireland, Tunisia, Ecuador, Cameroon, Greece, Zimbabwe, New Zealand, Chile, Switzerland, Republic of Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Croatia, Kuwait, Israel, Slovak Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iraq, South Africa, Colombia, Syrian Arab Republic, Portugal, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Malaysia.

13. At the 660th plenary meeting of the Conference on 12 August 1993, the Special Coordinator for membership, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of

Australia, who was appointed by the President at the 639th plenary meeting, submitted a report to the Conference, which reads as follows (CD/1214):

"1. On 28 January this year, the Conference appointed me as its Special Coordinator for the issue of expanding its membership. This decision to appoint a special coordinator came in the light of the report presented on 18 January by the former president of the Conference, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, who in conjunction with Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, had held consultations in the second half of 1992 on this matter. At an earlier point there had also been an effort to have a small expansion of the Conference, but that effort was ultimately unsuccessful.

"2. The view that the time has come for the Conference to expand its membership has been sharpened by the successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That outcome has been widely applauded internationally and has undoubtedly stimulated interest in membership of the Conference, not least amongst those who had been waiting for many years to have their applications considered.

"3. It is also the case that, with the ending of the cold war, there are many new opportunities for the international community to address the politico-military challenges in new and hopefully more effective ways. In the new environment it is clear that many Governments see an enhanced role for the Conference on Disarmament.

"4. Thus the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 'New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post cold war era' received a ready response from the Conference on Disarmament, and many representatives from here participated in the resumed First Committee in March this year. At that resumed session there were many expressions of support for the determination of the Conference on Disarmament to review its membership and its agenda in the new circumstances.

"5. With this background in mind, I held bilateral discussions with each of my colleagues on several occasions, and also with each of the CD groups. I thus obtained first hand a sense of what outcome could be tolerable to all, at the same time registering what were the sensitivities and aspirations of each CD member. I circulated a survey which was designed to allow any comments that members wished to have recorded. I considered holding informal open-ended consultations on this matter but at the request of a number of delegations who wished me not to proceed in that way, I decided to proceed in the way that I have described.

"6. It quickly became apparent that a discussion of criteria for membership would lead only to indefinite delay. Attempts to define in some 'objective' way the criteria for membership flew in the face of the history of previous efforts at expansion of the Conference which had not previously been able to define such criteria, of its current composition and of the widely varying

views about what such criteria might be, how they could be defined and in what way they might be applied. I decided a more practical course was to try to find an acceptable outcome.

"7. Finding an acceptable outcome was made easier by the fact that there seemed to be very broad acceptance that the CD should remain a negotiating body and thus of limited composition, that its rule of consensus should remain, and that it should concentrate on developing agreements and treaties in the field of security, arms control and disarmament. Thus it was possible to pose the question 'given the things that we agree the Conference should do, and given the expressions of interest by those who are willing to participate in its work, who is not currently a member who ought to be included?' This formulation also had the advantage of drawing attention to the tasks to be done rather than any artificial criteria.

"8. In seeking to find a proposal that would be acceptable to all members of the Conference, there were three particular problems that needed to be overcome. Firstly there was the question of procedure: was the Conference entirely autonomous in its decision over its own membership? Some in the Conference answered unambiguously yes; others had a more nuanced approach, others said no. The conclusion I drew was that in its process of considering the recommendation for expansion, the Conference should follow procedures that avoided raising the in-principle question of its status vis-à-vis the General Assembly. I outline some suggestions at the end of this report which follow precisely the precedent established in 1978.

"9. Secondly, there was considerable hesitation about the addition of new members which raised particularly sensitive issues for some countries. While those sensitivities remain, I believe that they will not be such as to prevent the adoption of the recommendation for a new CD composition attached to this report.

"10. Thirdly there was naturally considerable interest in the overall balance that might emerge from any expansion. Here several aspects are worth recording. While a number of countries preferred a relatively small expansion - by say 10-12 - it quickly became clear that within such a small expansion it would be impossible to satisfy the competing regional, political, geo-strategic and other claims. Equally it also became clear that a large expansion - including the idea that all who applied should be admitted - could not attract consensus. It emerged that between these contending views, common ground might be found around an expansion to about 60 members. This number had the additional benefit of representing about one third of United Nations Members which is approximately the same proportion of the United Nations membership that the original CD represented when it was established.

"11. An additional benefit of an expansion to about 60 is that it creates enough manoeuvrability to accommodate a wide variety of applicant countries.

In considering the question of expansion, I reluctantly came to the view that I would not recommend for inclusion countries which had chosen not to apply: this despite the fact that several countries who are not applicants would seem to have strong credentials.

"12. Thus I came to the conclusion that the only way forward at this stage was to recommend a limited expansion from amongst the current applicants in a way that leads overall to a conference capable of addressing the problems and opportunities before it.

"13. In considering how to strike a balance in the context of the expansion, I also had to take account of the fact that the Conference had a very particular origin and that within its original groupings there were some unusual features. Nor was I given the task of changing the current composition or of reconstructing the Conference. I asked if any current members wished to withdraw but none did. My recommendation preserves closely the balance in the CD at present if the current members were considered from a United Nations General Assembly regional perspective. It is also balanced in overall geo-strategic terms.

"14. On the last page of this report and an integral part of it is my recommendation for a composition for the Conference with the new members representing the expansion being underlined. I would like to emphasize that this recommendation is part of a phased approach, since the extension of the composition of the Conference is a dynamic process, and will no doubt be subject to periodic reviews in the future. It may be argued that there are other possible ways of achieving this result. I can only say that my recommendation represents my best estimate of an approach which is likely to attract consensus.

"15. Mr. President, I assume that in due course you will ask the Conference to decide on this report. If the Conference is willing to accept this recommendation, in line with the practice established in 1978 when the Conference itself was constituted, I suggest that the CD President inform the President of the General Assembly of the agreement reached following appropriate consultations in the Conference on Disarmament, and in line with document A/S-10/24 of 19 September 1978 invite the President of the Assembly to so inform the States Members of the United Nations. The new members would then assume their membership at the start of the 1994 session.

"16. I ask that this report be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

"ATTACHMENT I

"RECOMMENDED COMPOSITION OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
FOLLOWING EXPANSION (NEW MEMBERS ARE UNDERLINED)

"1. Algeria
"2. Argentina
"3. Australia
"4. Austria
"5. Bangladesh
"6. Belarus
"7. Belgium
"8. Brazil
"9. Bulgaria
"10. Cameroon
"11. Canada
"12. Chile
"13. China
"14. Colombia
"15. Cuba
"16. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
"17. Egypt
"18. Ethiopia
"19. Finland
"20. France
"21. Germany
"22. Hungary
"23. India
"24. Indonesia
"25. Iraq
"26. Iran
"27. Israel
"28. Italy
"29. Japan
"30. Kenya
"31. Mexico
"32. Mongolia
"33. Morocco
"34. Myanmar
"35. Netherlands
"36. New Zealand
"37. Nigeria
"38. Norway
"39. Pakistan
"40. Peru
"41. Poland
"42. Republic of Korea
"43. Romania
"44. Russian Federation
"45. Senegal
"46. Slovakia
"47. South Africa
"48. Spain
"49. Sri Lanka
"50. Sweden
"51. Switzerland
"52. Syria
"53. Turkey
"54. Ukraine
"55. United Kingdom
"56. United States
"57. Venezuela
"58. Viet Nam
"59. Zaire
"60. Zimbabwe
"61. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*

"* There is agreement in the Conference that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which was an original member of the CD has ceased to exist. There is, however, no agreement on successor arrangements, nor on removing the nameplate 'Yugoslavia'. There is an understanding that representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) will not attempt to occupy the 'Yugoslavia' seat."

14. At the 663rd plenary meeting on 26 August 1993, the Special Coordinator for membership made a statement clarifying some elements of his previous report and requested that his statement be included as an integral part of that report. The statement reads as follows:

"I take the floor to clarify some elements of the report I presented on 12 August as the Special Coordinator of the CD for the expansion of its membership. I do so because I understand that with these clarifications a number of delegations would be able to satisfy themselves about the report.

"In the report I emphasized that the expansion I proposed should be dynamic and part of a phased approach. The expansion proposed represents consensus on what can be achieved as a first step at present.

"It follows logically from the concept of a dynamic and phased approach which I proposed that my recommendation is not meant to be exclusionary or static. It would be useful therefore if the concept of expansion of membership continued to be addressed particularly with reference to States whose presence would be significant for the work of the Conference. I recommend, therefore, that the CD would keep the expansion of its membership under review beginning in 1994.

"In order to do this on as comprehensive a basis as possible, and taking into account those who are already applicants, any other country interested in membership in the CD may apply as soon as possible. Efforts should be made to address these cases as a follow-up to the present expansion.

"I would also suggest the Conference review its membership at regular intervals, say every five or ten years, in the light of its experience with its initial enlargement and in accordance with rule 2 of the rules of procedure. This would give an assurance that the dynamic approach would continue.

"As I said on 12 August, my recommendation represents a very delicately balanced package. I hope the foregoing statement will help make it acceptable to all.

"I request that this statement be included as an integral part of my report on the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament."

15. At the 664th and 665th plenary meetings, the Conference discussed the report of the Special Coordinator for membership. Many delegations made statements. No conclusion was reached at this stage. The President of the Conference will continue consultations to achieve consensus during the inter-sessional period (CD/PV.664 and 665).

F. Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference

16. By paragraph 1º of its last report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173), the Conference decided to continue consideration of

its improved and effective functioning at the current annual session, in the same format and under the same Chairmanship as in previous years.

17. Six informal open-ended consultations under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan were held during the annual session. As in 1992, the informal open-ended consultations were open to non-member States participating in the work of the Conference and several non-members did so.

18. At its 662nd plenary meeting on 19 August 1993, the Chairman submitted his report (CD/WP.446) to the Conference on the open-ended consultations. At the 663rd plenary meeting on 26 August 1993, the Conference took note with appreciation of that report.

19. As a result of those open-ended consultations, general agreement emerged on ways to improve and make more effective the functioning of the Conference in the following areas:

(a) Report writing: Consensus emerged around the following guidelines to be borne in mind while drafting future reports: (i) in order to assist the President in discharging his responsibilities under rule 44 of the rules of procedure, the Chairman of each ad hoc committee or group will prepare, with the help of the Secretariat, the draft of the report of his ad hoc committee or group that will be then discussed and agreed among delegations; (ii) the report should be shortened to avoid the repetition of known earlier positions. However, the objective of clarity and conciseness should not impact adversely on matters of substance; (iii) adequate care should be taken to draft a "chapeau" so as to ensure that previous positions, which are still current, are adequately safeguarded and recalled; (iv) issues on which there has been movement should be highlighted. In doing so, points of agreement and points of disagreement should both be suitably presented; (v) nothing should prevent an analytical portion in the introduction being prepared by the Chairman/President and agreed among delegations; (vi) individual countries may be referred to by name in the report; (vii) the current practice of negotiating the report should be retained; (viii) this procedure should be reviewed next year.

(b) Presidency: There was general agreement that, while no change should be made in the current four-week tenure (spanning the inter-sessional gaps whenever they occurred), it would be desirable for the President to associate the outgoing President as well as the incoming President in all consultations, including the Wednesday Presidential Consultations.

(c) Session dates: After reviewing the information provided by the Secretariat, there was general agreement to postpone the opening date of the third part of the 1993 session from 19 to 26 July and to close it on 3 September.

(d) Computerization of CD documents: There was a general feeling that the Optical Disk System (ODS) of the United Nations Office at Geneva should be coordinated with the UNDAIS system being developed by the Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), in order to ensure a rational use of existing resources. In that connection, the presence of a representative of ODA would be welcomed at future consultations on this subject.

(e) Additional meetings and informal discussions: It was generally agreed that, at the request of any delegation, Conference Presidents should, in accordance with rule 19, make increasing use of informal open-ended consultation procedures.

20. The Conference on Disarmament will continue consideration of its improved and effective functioning at its next annual session, in the same format and under the same Chairmanship.

G. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

21. In accordance with rule 42 of the rules of procedure, a list of all communications from non-governmental organizations and persons was circulated to the Conference (document CD/NGO/26).

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE DURING ITS 1993 SESSION

22. The substantive work of the Conference during its 1993 session was based on its agenda and programme of work. The list of documents issued by the Conference, as well as the texts of those documents, are included as appendix I to the report. An index of the verbatim records by country and subject, listing the statements made by delegations during 1993, and the verbatim records of the meetings of the Conference, are attached as appendix II to the report.

23. The Conference received a letter dated 24 December 1992 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CD/1176) transmitting his report entitled "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era" (A/C.1/47/7). The Secretary-General had been requested to do so by paragraph (c) of decision 47/422 of the General Assembly.

24. The Conference also had before it a letter dated 29 December 1992 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CD/1177 and Add.1) transmitting all the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session in 1992, including those entrusting specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament:

47/44 "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields"

47/47 "Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty"

47/50 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

47/51 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"

47/52 B "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"

47/52 C "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes"

47/52 D "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes"

47/52 J "Regional disarmament"

47/52 L "Transparency in armaments"

47/53 C "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons"

47/54 D "Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures"

47/54 E "Report of the Conference on Disarmament"

25. By paragraph (c) of the above-mentioned decision 47/422 of the General Assembly, the Conference was requested to transmit to the Chairman of the First Committee the results of its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era" by 15 February 1993, as well as the status of its ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work by 20 February 1993.

26. In connection with that decision, the Conference adopted the following documents:

(a) CD/1183, dated 18 February 1993, entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament on the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled 'New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold Era'".

A large number of States participating in the work of the Conference individually stated their national views on the report of the Secretary-General, which were reflected in the records of the Conference, as follows: CD/PV.636, 637, 639, 640, 641, 642 and 643. The delegation of Canada submitted document CD/1186, dated 26 February 1993, transmitting the views of its Government on that report.

(b) CD/1184, dated 18 February 1993, entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament on the Ongoing Review of the Agenda, Composition and Methods of Work of the Conference".

27. At the 636th plenary meeting of the Conference on 19 January 1993, the Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference conveyed to the Conference a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the opening of the 1993 session (CD/PV.636).

28. In addition to documents separately listed under specific items, the Conference received the following:

(a) Document CD/1175, dated 10 September 1992, submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, entitled "Statement by the

Governments of the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Chile relating to the Provisions of Article 28 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco".

(b) Document CD/1178, dated 15 January 1993, submitted by the delegation of Romania, entitled "Letter dated 13 January 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Romania addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Decision of the Government of Romania on the import and export regime of items and technologies under final destination control, as well as on the export control regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of missiles carrying such weapons".

(c) Document CD/1203, dated 7 June 1993, submitted by the delegation of Iraq, entitled "Letter received on 2 June 1993 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament in connection with Security Council Resolution 687".

(d) Document CD/1215, dated 16 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled "Letter dated 31 July 1993 from the Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Joint Declaration on Relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Belarus released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary on 22 July 1993".

(e) Document CD/1216, dated 16 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of Belarus, entitled "Letter dated 31 July 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Belarus addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Joint Declaration on Relations between the Republic of Belarus and the United States of America signed in Washington, D.C. on 22 July 1993 by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus, S. Shushkevich, and the President of the United States of America, B. Clinton".

A. Nuclear Test Ban

29. During the 1993 session, the Conference had before it the progress reports on the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events as contained in documents CD/1185 and CD/1211. The Ad Hoc Group met from 15 to 26 February and from 26 July to 6 August, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. At its 649th and 663rd plenary meetings on 18 May and 26 August, the Conference adopted the recommendations contained in those progress reports. Several delegations commented on them.

30. The list of new documents presented to the Conference under the agenda item is contained in the report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee referred to in the following paragraph.

31. At its 665th plenary meeting on 3 September 1993, the Conference adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Committee re-established by the Conference under the

agenda item at its 637th plenary meeting (see para. 6 above). That report (CD/1220) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

"1. At its 637th plenary meeting on 21 January 1993, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to re-establish an ad hoc committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban' (CD/1180), with the mandate resulting from the 1992 consultations conducted by the special coordinator on this item, contained in CD/1179, as follows:

'In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban".

'The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue, as a step towards achieving a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance.

'Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, it will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations.

'The Conference also requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue the examination of the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system of a nuclear test-ban treaty. The Ad Hoc Committee will also take into account the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

'The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1993 session. This report should include, inter alia, the Committee's recommendations on how the objectives of the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear Test Ban", should be carried forward most effectively in 1994.'

"2. At its 659th plenary meeting on 10 August 1993, the Conference adopted the following decision on agenda item 1 (CD/1212):

'The Conference on Disarmament,

'Taking note of initiatives regarding the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTB),

'Convinced that, to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of

nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security, a CTB should be universal and internationally and effectively verifiable,

'Convinced further that, in order to achieve this goal, it is important that a CTB be multilaterally negotiated,

'Stressing that, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, it is the appropriate forum for negotiating a CTB,

'Decides to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTB,

'Requests the Chairman of its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to make the necessary arrangements to conduct consultations during the period between 3 September 1993 and 17 January 1994 on the specific mandate for, and the organization of, the negotiation.'

"3. At the same meeting, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee announced that he would proceed without delay to make the necessary arrangements for the consultations he was requested to conduct by the Conference.

"II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

"4. At the 639th plenary meeting on 28 January 1993, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Michael Cassandra of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary.

"5. As it had announced in May 1992, the delegation of France participated for the first time in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. France's decision to participate was widely welcomed in the Ad Hoc Committee.

"6. In accordance with the decision of the Conference adopted at its 603rd plenary meeting on 22 August 1991, the Ad Hoc Committee was open to all the non-member States invited by the Conference to participate in its work.

"7. The Ad Hoc Committee held 19 meetings from 18 February to 24 August 1993. In addition, the Chairman conducted a number of informal consultations with delegations.

"8. The following official documents dealing with a nuclear test ban were presented to the Conference:

- CD/1179, dated 22 January 1993, entitled 'Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 1'.

- CD/1199, dated 26 May 1993, submitted by the delegation of Canada, enclosing a booklet entitled 'Non-Seismic Technologies in support of a Nuclear Test Ban'.

- CD/1200/Rev.1, dated 11 June 1993, submitted by the Group of 21, entitled 'Group of 21: draft statement' (first submitted as a draft decision on 2 June 1993).

- CD/1201, dated 3 June 1993, submitted by the delegation of Canada, enclosing a booklet entitled 'Constraining Proliferation: the Contribution of Verification Synergies'.

- CD/1202, dated 3 June 1993, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled 'Text of a Draft Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty'.

- CD/1204, dated 17 June 1993, submitted by the delegation of Mexico, transmitting copy of a letter entitled 'Letter on Nuclear Testing sent to the President of the United States on 14 June 1993 by the Members of the Pugwash Council attending the 43rd Pugwash Conference in Hasseludden, Sweden'.

- CD/1205, dated 20 July 1993, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled 'Text of President Clinton's radio address of 2 July 1993 regarding his decision on U.S. nuclear testing policy'.

- CD/1208, dated 27 July 1993, submitted by the delegation of Venezuela, entitled 'Text of a communiqué issued by the Government of Venezuela in connection with the extension of the existing moratorium on nuclear testing'.

- CD/1209, dated 3 August 1993, submitted by the delegations of Australia, Mexico and Nigeria, entitled 'Draft decision'.

- CD/1210, dated 4 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of Indonesia, entitled 'Message from Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and President of the Amendment Conference of States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty'.

- CD/1212, dated 10 August 1993, entitled 'Decision on agenda item 1 "Nuclear Test Ban" adopted by the Conference on Disarmament at its 659th plenary meeting on 10 August 1993'.

"In addition, the following working papers were presented to the Ad Hoc Committee:

- CD/NTB/WP.15, dated 26 February 1993, submitted by the delegation of Australia, entitled 'A Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Some reflections on verification'.

- CD/NTB/WP.16 (also issued as CD/1199).

- CD/NTB/WP.17, dated 28 May 1993, submitted by the delegation of France, entitled 'General introduction to non-seismic detection techniques'.

- CD/NTB/WP.18 (also issued as CD/1201).

- CD/NTB/WP.19 (also issued as CD/1202).

- CD/NTB/WP.20, dated 11 June 1993, submitted by the delegation of Japan, entitled 'NTB verification system by satellite'.

- CD/NTB/WP.21, dated 11 June 1993, submitted by the delegation of the Russian Federation, entitled 'Non-seismic methods of detecting nuclear explosions in the interests of monitoring a comprehensive nuclear test ban'.

- CD/NTB/WP.22 and Corr.1, dated 25 June 1993, submitted by the delegation of New Zealand, entitled 'Verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban by means of non-seismic techniques: hydroacoustic methods'.

- CD/NTB/WP.23, dated 25 June 1993, submitted by the delegation of France, entitled 'Non-seismic detection techniques: survey of the state of the art and problems of synergy'.

- CD/NTB/WP.24 (also issued as CD/1205).

- CD/NTB/WP.25, dated 5 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of Norway, entitled 'Non-seismic detection of nuclear detonations'.

- CD/NTB/WP.26, dated 24 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of Australia, entitled 'Hydroacoustics and CTBT verification'.

- CD/NTB/WP.27, dated 24 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of Australia, entitled 'A CTBT and satellite and overhead verification technology'.

- CD/NTB/WP.28, dated 24 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of Australia, entitled 'On-site verification measures, transparency and information-sharing'.

- CD/NTB/WP.29, dated 24 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of Australia, entitled 'Review of the discussion of non-seismic verification methods'.

- CD/NTB/WP.30, dated 24 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of Australia, entitled 'Some reflections on existing proposals'.

- CD/NTB/WP.31, dated 24 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, entitled 'On-site inspection for nuclear test ban verification'.

- CD/NTB/WP.32, dated 24 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of The Netherlands, entitled 'Measuring radio-activity in the atmosphere and hydroacoustics: non-seismological monitoring techniques as part of the comprehensive verification system for a nuclear test ban treaty'.

"The following conference room papers were before the Ad Hoc Committee:

- CD/NTB/CRP.16, dated 18 February 1993, entitled 'Indicative Schedule of Meetings - First part (19 January - 26 March 1993)'.

- CD/NTB/CRP.16/Add.1, dated 25 March 1993, entitled 'Indicative Schedule of Meetings - Second part (10 May - 25 June 1993)'.

- CD/NTB/CRP.16/Add.2, dated 24 June 1993, entitled 'Indicative Schedule of Meetings - Third part (26 July - 3 September 1993)'.

- CD/NTB/CRP.17/Rev.1, dated 23 August 1993, entitled 'Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban'.

"Furthermore, upon the request of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Secretariat updated a list of documents relating to a Nuclear Test Ban, submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament, and the Conference on Disarmament (CD/NTB/INF.1/Add.2 of 16 February 1993).

"III. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 1993 SESSION

"9. From the outset of the 1993 session, the members of the Ad Hoc Committee were keenly aware that its deliberations throughout the session would be taking place in the context of a rapidly evolving international situation, particularly in the area of nuclear disarmament, and that its programme of work would therefore need to be adaptable to any possible developments in the field of nuclear testing. Moreover, the Ad Hoc Committee began its work in an atmosphere of heightened anticipation for a new momentum at the multilateral level towards a comprehensive test ban treaty, especially in the light of the moratorium on nuclear testing declared by the Russian Federation in October 1991, by France in April 1992, and by the United States in October 1992, and in the light of the fact that the United Kingdom had not conducted a test since November 1991, nor had China since September 1992. Many delegations from different groups made appeals, both in the Ad Hoc Committee and in the plenary meetings of the Conference, for the nuclear-weapon States to continue their declared moratoria beyond July 1993, and for all nuclear-weapon States which had not done so to join the moratoria.

"10. The question of a CTBT received a great deal of attention in plenary meetings of the Conference throughout the annual session. The many views expressed in these meetings are contained in the following official records of the Conference: (CD/PV.636, 638-646, 648-652, 654-662).

"11. The delegations of the Group of 21, Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), considered that it is urgent to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. They stressed, furthermore, that the conclusion of such a treaty would have a decisive influence on the outcome of the 1995 NPT Conference.

"12. Other delegations of States Parties to the NPT, while recognizing the importance of negotiations of a CTBT, thought it essential to avoid linkage with the outcome of the 1995 NPT Conference, since this could put at risk the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the maintenance of which would remain an essential element of international security. They underlined, furthermore, that the aim of a CTBT which genuinely contributed to non-proliferation would not be furthered by the imposition of deadlines.

"13. Against this background, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted on 18 February 1993 a schedule for its first part only (CD/NTB/CRP.16). It began its work with general debate followed by discussions on verification and compliance and structure and scope as requested by the Conference in its mandate cited above.

"14. During the course of general debate, upon a special request of the Ad Hoc Committee's Chairman, the nuclear-weapon States outlined their policies in respect of nuclear testing and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The updates received from the nuclear-weapon States were highly appreciated by the other members of the Ad Hoc Committee. (The policies of the nuclear-weapon States were also elucidated at the following plenary meetings of the Conference: China - 645th plenary on 4 March and 650th plenary on 25 May; France - 657th plenary on 29 July; the Russian Federation - 640th plenary on 2 February and 658th plenary on 5 August; the United Kingdom - 658th plenary on 5 August and the United States - 657th plenary on 29 July.) Upon the invitation of the Chairman, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts briefed the Ad Hoc Committee on the work of the Group during its thirty-fifth session when the Committee addressed the questions of verification and compliance.

"15. There was a widely held view that, while seismic monitoring should form the core of future CTBT verification, monitoring by seismic means alone might not give confidence in compliance with a test ban. The Ad Hoc Committee therefore found that there was a need to begin an exploratory exercise on verification technologies, other than seismic, that could be useful for the verification system for a future CTBT. The Ad Hoc Committee, upon different proposals put forward by Australia and Germany on the subject, decided to devote the entirety of the second part of the session to an exploration of such non-seismic technologies (CD/NTB/CRP.16/Add.1). In order to enhance the technical level of the discussions, it was requested that delegations in a position to do so be assisted by technical experts. Twenty expert presentations were delivered over the course of the second and third parts of the session in this unprecedented substantive consideration of non-seismic verification techniques, covering a wide range of technologies.

"16. The third part of the session began after important announcements had been made by the United States, France and the Russian Federation, on the issue of moratoria and on their policies on a CTBT, which were widely welcomed. These announcements are reflected in plenary statements made on 29 July and 5 August (see CD/PV.657 and 658). The discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee during the third part of the session were dominated by the process in the Conference which led to the 10 August decision to give the Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate and for the Chairman of the Committee to hold consultations on how to organize its future work.

"17. In parallel to those discussions, the Ad Hoc Committee continued to pursue its agreed agenda for the third part of the session (CD/NTB/CRP.16/Add.2). It began a discussion to consider the possible interrelationship of seismic and non-seismic verification technologies. As it was considered that the results of these discussions might have far-reaching consequences, some delegations believed it was premature to have in-depth talks on them. A suggestion was made to consider, for each of the possible environments in which a nuclear explosion could take place, holding a

two-to-three day meeting of experts and delegates with a view to considering the entire range of questions involved in verifying a particular environment.

"18. Also under this item, the Ad Hoc Committee heard a statement by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, which brought it up to date on the work of the Ad Hoc Group at its thirty-sixth session, focusing in particular on the costs of a future seismic network as they relate to system capability.

"19. The Ad Hoc Committee also took up, in accordance with the mandate given to it at the start of the 1993 annual session, a consideration of existing proposals. Under this item, several delegations commented on aspects of the draft for a CTBT put forward by Sweden on 3 June 1993 (CD/1202-CD/NTB/WP.19). A summary of the discussion on this item is found below.

"Structure and scope

"20. With regard to the issue of the scope of a future agreement, all delegations stressed that it was essential that a future CTBT be universally applicable, to non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to nuclear-weapon States, and effectively and internationally verifiable. Only in this way could the agreement make an effective contribution to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.

"21. In its 1991 report to the Conference, the Ad Hoc Committee dealt with the issue of whether to include in the prohibition nuclear tests for peaceful purposes (PNES). Sweden revised its proposed draft for a CTBT (see CD/1202), to include the obligation of a State Party to prohibit 'any nuclear-weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control'. Several delegations welcomed Sweden's inclusion of PNES within the scope of the prohibition of nuclear explosions.

"22. With regard to the question of a threshold nuclear test ban, the United States' delegation, for its part, clarified that its President had rejected the option of a 1-kiloton threshold agreement and would be seeking a comprehensive, not a limited or threshold, test ban.

"Verification and compliance

"23. There was general recognition that in order to ensure compliance with a future CTBT, an effective, internationally applicable verification system would be required. The Committee did not consider the scope of or the requirements for a verification regime. A number of delegations noted that, depending on future decisions on the scope of the prohibition and on requirements of the verification regime, much work remained to be done in this area. At the same time, a number of delegations registered their view that adequate verification technologies were already available. A view was also expressed that remaining difficulties might be more political than technical in nature. The question was raised as to whether the verification regime should cover possible nuclear explosions and preparatory activity in all environments. Some of the issues that preoccupied delegations during the session were those relating to:

- the substantial role that a global seismic monitoring network would have, especially in the underground test environment;

- the possible use of additional non-seismic verification technologies (see below) for the detection of nuclear tests in various environments including in relation to the question of evasion; and their possible use for the detection of pre-testing preparations;

- the question of costs of a future verification system, including in relation to its capabilities;

- the question of an implementing agency, its powers and functions and costs;

- the intimate inter-relationship between verification techniques applicable and the scope of Convention obligations; and,

- the issue of a possible mix of national and international means of verification, including in terms of cost effectiveness.

In addition to the issues listed above, India stressed that the verification system to be developed must be non-discriminatory in character in the sense of providing equal rights and obligations to the States Parties to the proposed treaty including equal access. Some other delegations expressed a similar view.

"24. The work of the Conference's Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, which is currently developing plans to test its revised concepts for an international seismic monitoring network in 1995, was generally appreciated. Various views were expressed on whether it was necessary or desirable to review the relationship of the Ad Hoc Committee to the Ad Hoc Group, including to take account of future negotiation requirements flowing from decisions to be taken by the Conference.

"25. The issue of whether an existing organization or a newly-created institution would be the implementing agency for the future agreement continued to evoke keen interest among delegations. Specifically on the table was the proposal contained in the Swedish draft CTBT (CD/1202) that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) be entrusted with verification of compliance with the treaty. Questions on the role that IAEA might play were raised during the discussions. Bearing in mind that it was still very early to identify a particular implementing agency for a future ban, the Ad Hoc Committee decided to recommend to the Conference that a representative of the IAEA be invited to provide relevant information to it.

"Non-seismic verification technologies

"26. During the second and third parts of the session, a variety of non-seismic technologies for verifying a future CTBT was examined for the first time in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee. Presentations on specific technologies were made either by experts themselves, as part of their national delegations, or by members of delegations, based on consultations with national experts. The Ad Hoc Committee used this exercise to identify

technologies which might be useful to a verification system, and to gather information from experts on the advantages and disadvantages of such non-seismic technologies. The Ad Hoc Committee did not draw conclusions on the technologies presented. Nevertheless, these discussions provided the Committee with a basis for ongoing work, including on the possible interrelationship of seismic and non-seismic verification technologies.

"27. The Ad Hoc Committee heard an overview of the subject by the delegations of Sweden and France which sought to place the discussion of individual non-seismic verification technologies in a broader context.

"28. Two possible uses of non-seismic verification techniques were suggested. Such techniques could be supplementary to a global seismic monitoring network, that is, collecting information in parallel with a seismic network, with several networks simultaneously transmitting information to competent international or national authorities. They could also be viewed as complementary information-gathering nets, once an event that needed clarification was detected by a seismic or other sort of network and a focused verification was needed. The following non-seismic verification technologies and measures were identified (see also the list of documents above containing references to some of the presentations made):

- Hydroacoustic monitoring system:
  presented by Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway;

- Surveillance of atmospheric radioactivity:
  presented by Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation and Sweden;

- Surveillance by satellite and aerial monitoring:
  presented by Australia, Canada, Japan and the Russian Federation;

- Electromagnetic pulse measurement:
  presented by Norway and the Russian Federation;

- Infrasound measurement of the atmosphere:
  presented by the Russian Federation;

- On-site observations and inspections:
  presented by Italy, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom;

- Chemical detection techniques:
  presented by Canada;

- Static and time variant three-dimensional resistivity measurements:
  presented by Canada;

- Transparency measures and nationally-derived information-sharing arrangements (CBMs), including exchange of information on large-scale conventional explosions, invitations to outside observers, and relevant geological information exchange:
  presented by Australia.

"29. In addition, Australia and France presented, in their national capacities, summaries of the discussions held. Australia put forward several procedural proposals for the way in which the Ad Hoc Committee could deepen its discussions on the technologies that might be included in an overall verification system for a CTBT. It suggested: (a) technical hearings in the Ad Hoc Committee; (b) appointments of Friends of the Chair to organize technology-specific programmes; and (c) adding new work strands to the seismic work being done by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. France, in its résumé, concluded that further work needed to be accomplished on how to establish synergy among the many techniques discussed.

"30. It was widely considered that this examination of non-seismic verification technologies was a useful first step towards a more focused examination of their applicability to an eventual complete verification regime for a CTBT. The interaction of these technologies with each other and with a seismic network would need further consideration. Important work needed to be done also on the costs and cost-effectiveness of various technologies, on the related question of the institutional arrangements for verification and on the issue of the use of nationally acquired information in an international verification system.

"Consideration of existing proposals

"31. Under this item, the Ad Hoc Committee heard preliminary comments and reactions from several delegations to the Swedish proposed draft CTBT (CD/1202). The Swedish delegation announced that it would be submitting annexed protocols to the draft, detailing the verification arrangements it envisaged. The submission of the draft CTBT was welcomed by several delegations as a stimulus to a further consideration of many issues raised in the draft. Comments on the draft focused mainly on the inclusion of PNES in the prohibition of nuclear tests (see above under 'Structure and scope'); on the proposal to entrust the IAEA with verification of compliance with the Treaty (see above under 'Verification and compliance'); on the suggested definition of a nuclear explosion; also on the need for clarification of what constituted the obligation not to 'cause' or 'assist' a nuclear test explosion.

"Conclusions and recommendations

"32. It was widely recognized that the adoption of a decision to give the Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate was a major turning point for multilateral work towards a CTBT. The Ad Hoc Committee benefited from a constructive and positive atmosphere throughout the session on the issues under its mandate. The deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee this session marked a qualitative step forward on the long road towards a CTBT. In particular, the unprecedented expert presentations and subsequent discussions on non-seismic verification technologies had contributed considerably to the work on verification issues.

"33. The Ad Hoc Committee welcomed the fact that, in accordance with the request made by the Conference in its decision (CD/1212) of 10 August 1993,

the Chairman would conduct consultations during the period between 3 September 1993 and 17 January 1994 on the specific mandate for, and the organization of, the negotiation of a CTBT.

"34. The Ad Hoc Committee recommends that it be reestablished at the outset of the 1994 session, taking into consideration the results of the consultations of the Chairman during the intersessional period."

B. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

32. The Conference did not establish an ad hoc committee on this agenda item during the 1993 session. The following new documents were submitted to the Conference under the agenda item:

(a) Document CD/1181, dated 5 February 1993, submitted by the delegation of Ukraine, entitled "Statement by Leonid M. Kravchuk, President of Ukraine, at the World Economic Forum, Davos, 30 January 1993".

(b) Document CD/1182, dated 12 February 1993, submitted by the delegation of Belarus, entitled "Letter dated 11 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Belarus addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament".

(c) Document CD/1192, dated 5 April 1993, submitted by the delegations of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, entitled "The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms - signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991".

(d) Document CD/1193, dated 5 April 1993, submitted by the delegations of Belarus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America, entitled "Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms - signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992 by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America".

(e) Document CD/1194, dated 5 April 1993, submitted by the delegations of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, entitled "The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms - signed at Moscow on 3 January 1993".

(f) Document CD/1195, dated 2 April 1993, submitted by the delegations of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, entitled "Letter dated 2 April 1993 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament by the Representatives of the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons transmitting a statement issued by the three Governments on 1 April 1993".

(g) Document CD/1196, dated 8 April 1993, submitted by the delegation of Mexico, entitled "Letter dated 5 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of Resolution 290 (VII) adopted by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean containing Amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco".

(h) Document CD/1197, dated 27 April 1993, submitted by the delegation of Turkey, entitled "Text of the Declaration of the Government of Turkey which associates itself with the Joint Statement of the Depositaries of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 concerning the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Treaty".

(i) Document CD/1198, dated 14 May 1993, submitted by the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, entitled "Statement of spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".

(j) Document CD/1213, dated 12 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of the Russian Federation, entitled "Letter dated 10 August 1993 from the Acting Representative of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a statement by the Government of the Russian Federation relating to Ukraine's policy concerning nuclear weapons located on its territory".

(k) Document CD/1221, dated 27 August 1993, submitted by the delegation of Ukraine, entitled "Letter dated 23 August 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the statement of the Press Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on matters concerning nuclear disarmament of Ukraine issued on 18 August 1993".

33. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the previous annual reports of the Conference, in particular paragraphs 41-56 of the 1992 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173), related official documents and working papers, as well as plenary records.

C. Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Matters

34. The Conference did not establish an ad hoc committee on this agenda item during the 1993 session. No new documents were submitted to the Conference specifically under the agenda item, although references were made by some delegations to documents listed in paragraph 32 above as relevant for agenda item 3.

35. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the previous annual reports of the Conference, in particular paragraphs 62-71 of the 1992 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173), related official documents and working papers, as well as plenary records.

D. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

36. The list of documents presented to the Conference during its 1993 session under the agenda item is contained in the report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee referred to in the following paragraph.

37. At its 665th plenary meeting, on 3 September 1993, the Conference adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Committee reestablished by the Conference under the agenda item at its 637th plenary meeting (see para. 6 above). That report (CD/1217) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

"1. At its 637th plenary meeting on 21 January 1993, the Conference on Disarmament established an Ad Hoc Committee on the item 'Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space' with the mandate contained in document CD/1125 of 14 February 1992.

"II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS

"2. At its 639th plenary meeting on 28 January 1993, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffman of Germany as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, served as the Committee's Secretary.

"3. The Ad Hoc Committee held 17 meetings between 16 February and 18 August 1993.

"4. In addition to the documents of the previous session 1/ the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following documents relating to the agenda item submitted to the Conference on Disarmament during the 1993 session:

CD/OS/WP.57	1993 Programme of Work
CD/OS/WP.58 and Corr.1	Working paper entitled 'Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space' submitted by Colonel Georgui Diachenko, Friend of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
CD/OS/WP.59	Working Paper entitled 'Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space, Notification of Launches of Space Objects and Ballistic Missiles' submitted by France

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"1/ The List of Documents of the previous sessions may be found in the 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992 Reports of the Ad Hoc Committee (CD/642, CD/732, CD/787, CD/870, CD/956, CD/1039, CD/1111 and CD/1165, respectively), and in the special report to the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (CD/834).

CD/OS/WP.60 2/ Chairman's Paper: Review of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space on issues relating to confidence-building measures in outer-space activities

CD/OS/WP.61 Working paper entitled 'Some Thoughts on the Design of Confidence-building Measures in Space Activities' submitted by Colonel Yuri Novosadov, Friend of the Chairman

CD/OS/WP.62 Working paper entitled 'Low-intrusiveness Measures for Monitoring a Protection Regime in Outer Space' submitted by Dr. Hubert Feigl, Expert of the Delegation of Germany

CD/OS/WP.63 Working paper entitled 'The Regulation of Nuclear Power Systems in Near-Earth Space as Confidence-building Measures aimed at Strengthening International Security' submitted by Bruno Bertotti, Dipartimento di Fisica Nucleare Teorica - Università di Pavia in collaboration with Luciano Anselmo, Centro Nazionale Universitario Calcolo Elettronico, Pisa and Paolo Farinella, Dipartimento di Matematica, Università di Pisa, Italy

CD/OS/WP.64 Working paper entitled 'Terminological Groundwork for Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space' submitted by Rafael M. Grossi, Friend of the Chairman

CD/OS/WP.65 Chairman's Suggestions for the Future Work of the Committee

CD/OS/WP.66 Summary of Experts' Presentations to the Ad Hoc Committee

CD/OS/WP.67 France - Working Paper - Ballistic Missiles, Space Objects and Launchers. Definitions

"III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1993 SESSION

"5. Following consultations on the organization of work at its first meeting on 16 February 1993, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted the following Programme of Work for the 1993 Session:

'1. Examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

'2. Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

'3. Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

'In carrying out its work with a view to finding and building upon areas of convergence, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account relevant

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"2/ CD/OS/WP.60* - reissued in English only.

proposals, initiatives and developments since the establishment of the Committee in 1985 including those presented at the 1992 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

'The practice of appointing Friends of the Chairman to organize open-ended consultations on issues of specific interest to the Committee should continue'

"6. The Ad Hoc Committee agreed that it would give equal treatment to the subjects covered by its mandate and specified in its Programme of Work. Accordingly, the Committee agreed to allocate the same number of meetings to each of those subjects, while any member wishing to do so may discuss any subject important and relevant to the work of the Committee.

"7. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee was governed by the mandate which aims at the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

"8. During the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, various Groups and individual delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions, the detailed descriptions of which can be found in the previous annual reports of the Committee, related Conference documents and Working Papers, and Plenary Records.

"9. The Ad Hoc Committee once again benefited from the scientific and technical contributions of experts from various delegations, who addressed the following specific issues and initiatives under consideration in the Committee: Professor B. Bertotti (Italy) 'The Regulation of Nuclear Power Systems in Near-Earth Space'; Dr. H. Feigl (Germany) 'Low-intrusiveness Measures for Monitoring a Protection Regime in Outer Space'; Dr. U. Ekblad (Sweden) 'Confidence-Building Measures as Means for Enhancing Space Security'; Mr H. Baccini (France) 'French Procedures used for the National and International Notification of Launches of the European Launcher Ariane IV'; Major K. Story (United States of America) 'Close Encounters in Space, the Keep-Out Zone Problem'; and Professor Dr. M. Abdel-Hady (Egypt) 'verification Using Satellites as Confidence-Building Measures in Disarmament Affairs'. The content of those presentations is contained in document CD/OS/WP.66 dated 13 August 1993. A representative of UNIDIR briefed the Committee on the activities of the Institute in this field.

"10. The Ad Hoc Committee continued to enjoy the assistance of the Friends of the Chairman who were appointed by the Chairman to deal with the following issues without prejudice to positions of delegations in open-ended consultations:

"(i) confidence-building measures in outer space (Colonel G. Diachenko, Delegation of the Russian Federation, subsequently succeeded by Colonel Y. Novosadov and Colonel V. Sukharev);

"(ii) terminology and other relevant legal aspects related to prevention of an arms race in outer space (Mr R. Grossi, Delegation of Argentina).

"Summary of the efforts of the Friends of the Chairman

"(a) The respective Friends of the Chairman (Russian Federation) analysed all relevant numerous proposals related to the elaboration of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in outer space activities submitted over the years by the members of the Ad Hoc Committee and presented their assessment in documents CD/OS/WP.58 of 12 March 1993 and Corr.1 of 22 June 1993, and CD/OS/WP.61 of 26 May 1993. These proposals covered primarily the issues of the transparency of outer space activities (provision by States of more detailed information concerning planned and actual activities in outer space), the issues of elaborating a 'code of conduct' and 'rules of the road' in outer space, the issues of verification, as well as issues concerning the establishment of different international organizations that would favour the actual implementation of confidence-building measures. Based on the substance of the two above-mentioned documents prepared by the Friends of the Chairman and from the consultations held, it appeared that the majority of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee supported, one way or another, the idea of using confidence-building measures as a first step towards finding an encompassing solution to the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. Such an approach, being a phased one by its nature, would initially allow the creation of an entire system of measures removing suspicion from outer space activities conducted by States and, in the long term, focusing further efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee to find efficient means of preventing an arms race in outer space. The Friends of the Chairman were of the view that it would be appropriate to widen and change the existing mandate.

"(b) The Friend of the Chairman (Argentina), proposed to the Committee a different course of action from that followed in previous exercises of the Committee in the area of terminological and other relevant legal aspects. The methodology proposed consisted in leaving aside fundamental problems of the space debate, such as the question of peaceful/non-peaceful uses of outer space or the discussion of the scope of terms such as militarization in a space context, on the assumption that these had been widely discussed by analysts in different fora and academic circles for a number of years without success. The Friend of the Chairman suggested establishing a link between the terminological exercise with the area of proposals and initiatives, the latter being the one that clearly embodies the future concrete activities of the Committee. Delegations thus agreed to concentrate their work initially on terminological and other relevant legal aspects directly related to existing proposals on confidence-building measures. The Friend of the Chairman prepared, under his own responsibility, a Working Paper (CD/OS/WP.64), intended to provide a basis for the consultations that were held. That document suggested as objectives for the terminological work the following: to provide additional clarification on the scope and objectives of existing proposals; to reduce possible redundancies and overlaps which might exist between different proposals; and to assist the Ad Hoc Committee in its assessment of the political acceptability and/or technical feasibility of proposals. In keeping with these guidelines, the document of the Friend of the Chairman drew attention to an indicative list of terms drawn from existing proposals in the area of confidence-building measures, and provided cross references to existing legal instruments already including definitions of those terms. Delegations, having made specific proposals, also provided additional references as well as their own definitions for selected terms.

Finally, some delegations pointed out the importance of also addressing definitions related to space weapons. In this connection they recalled proposals and Working Papers introduced in previous sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee.

"11. The delegation of France introduced a proposal for the prior notification of launches of space objects and ballistic missiles (CD/OS/WP.59). It recalled that, in its view, the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space could be gradually attained through a set of measures designed to ensure the security of space activities, to establish the illegal character of aggressive uses of outer space, and to increase confidence and transparency in space activities. Moreover, it considered that, since most space technologies could be used to produce ballistic missiles able to deliver weapons of mass destruction, there was a need to ensure, through increased transparency, that space technologies were not diverted to non-peaceful uses. France, considering that the 1975 Registration Convention was insufficient, proposed that the Conference on Disarmament negotiate a new international instrument providing for the prior notification of launches of space objects and ballistic missiles and the establishment, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international notification centre tasked with the collection and the dissemination of the data notified by the launching States. A number of delegations supported this initiative, considering that it could offer a realistic solution to the present deadlock in the Ad Hoc Committee due to the demands for more far-reaching negotiations on the one hand, and the need for further discussions on the other.

"12. The Group of 21 noted that the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security, could facilitate negotiations as envisaged in the mandate of the Committee. The Group maintained that the prevention of an arms race in outer space would pave the way for the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space solely for the common interest and benefit of mankind and that States with advanced space technology and capabilities had special responsibilities for the discontinuance of all weapon-related activities adversely affecting the peaceful uses of outer space. It felt that, among the concrete proposals made on confidence-building measures, many were ripe for implementation, and some elements of these could form integral parts of a multilaterally negotiated agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this regard, whilst appreciating the work carried out so far by the Friends of the Chairman on CBMs, the Group reiterated that, because of their supplementary and interim nature, CBMs were not an end in themselves. Their treatment in this Ad Hoc Committee should in no way detract, retard, or negatively affect, the attainment of its primary objective, namely, the conclusion of an international agreement, or agreements, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, with a view to reinforcing the existing legal regime. Such an agreement, or agreements, should themselves include, and be the very cornerstone, of CBMs. The Group of 21 took note of, and shared the view of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, on the need to widen and enrich the present mandate with a negotiating character. In this regard, it encouraged the Chairman to pursue his consultations with a view to formulating a new mandate acceptable to all. The Group also reaffirmed its willingness to work towards filling in the gaps that existed in the present outer space legal regime and reiterated that the conclusion of a multilaterally negotiated

agreement, or agreements, for the elimination of the danger to international peace and security of an arms race in outer space should remain the most important area of responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament.

"13. The delegation of Argentina referred to the area of confidence-building measures as one of the cornerstones of space stability and security. It considered CBMs in outer space as an appropriate example of a preventive measure in the space field. In the view of this delegation, the use of this type of measure in space, if applied with the same zeal and scope as in the case of the European continent, could be essential to avoid an arms race in space. An updated mandate for the Committee should, in its opinion, start with the consideration of CBMs.

"14. The delegation of China also emphasized that while CBMs contributed to the positive development in international relations, their role was limited for the objective of this Committee. CBMs, on their own, could not eliminate the danger of weaponization in outer space. Therefore, the discussions on CBMs should not obstruct or delay indefinitely the process of formulating an effective legal instrument banning all space weapons and preventing an arms race in outer space.

"15. The delegation of China pointed out that the notification of launches of ballistic missiles was not directly related to the work of this Committee. Ballistic missiles were not space objects, and their trajectory was mostly in atmosphere and thin atmosphere. Therefore, it was not possible for them to cause collision of space objects. The issue of notification of launches of ballistic missiles exceeded the Committee's mandate and should not be dealt with by it. Consequently, the term 'ballistic missile' should not necessarily be included in the discussions on terminology in the Committee. Some other delegations expressed the opposite view.

"16. The delegation of India had consistently put forward the idea of a ban on testing, development and deployment of all anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). The existing legal regime already posed a wide variety of legal restraints on the nature, development and the use of ASATs. Therefore, the delegation of India had subscribed to the 'narrow' interpretation of the ABM Treaty that it prohibited the development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based and land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized. Since satellite technology generated enormous opportunities in the field of economic growth and international security, it was imperative that the increasing positive developments of satellite technology should be safeguarded on an urgent basis. The Committee could approach the inadequacies of the existing international regime through its progressive development to address contemporary realities and the need to prevent an arms race in outer space. Such development should not, however, conflict with other aspects of international law on outer space. Confidence-building measures should be transparent and should not impede civilian national space programmes or international cooperation in space for peaceful purposes. CBMs were not a substitute for disarmament, though India acknowledged the contribution of CBMs in reducing the risk of misperceptions. Therefore, any future terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Committee should also

include the need for engaging in actual multilateral negotiations with the objective of establishing an effective legal agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space.

"17. Mexico voiced concern at the fact that major Powers continued to place more sophisticated defence systems in outer space. It stated that anti-ballistic missile defence systems were contrary to the spirit of various international agreements concerning the exploration and use of outer space for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind. Increased efforts needed to be made in the Ad Hoc Committee to arrive at an international legal regime preventing the militarization of outer space. With reference to the work done by the Friends of the Chairman on confidence-building measures and on questions of terminology and other relevant legal questions, the delegation said that, while the first ones increase transparency and predictability, they should not become a substitute for the primary objective of prohibiting the development, testing, manufacture, deployment and use of all space weapons. The definition of generally accepted terms was also important but should not be seen as an end in itself; it should perhaps be tackled specifically, with an analysis of existing initiatives, in order to achieve progress in the strengthening of the existing legal regime. Hence the delegation suggested to discuss the Venezuelan proposal (document CD/851 of 2 August 1988), namely to amend Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty so as to extend the scope of the ban on weapons in space.

"18. The delegation of the Netherlands stated that, due to changes in the international security environment, new possibilities had been created for the utilization of space technology for peaceful purposes. The delegation agreed with the Chairman's conclusion that the time had come to envisage the elaboration of a legal instrument establishing CBMs. It believed that the Ad Hoc Committee could engage in negotiating a set of CBMs concerning three different subjects:

"(a) reinforcing existing legal instruments;

"(b) notification of launches of ballistic missiles; and

"(c) information concerning space activities.

Welcoming the suggestion that a new mandate should be considered for the Ad Hoc Committee, the delegation expressed the hope that it would finally be possible in 1994 to establish an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate which would be better suited to practical needs.

"19. The delegation of Poland felt that CBMs presented the most direct route to the ultimate goal - a safe and stable outer space regime. It supported the idea of using CBMs as an important instrument and an intermediate step towards that goal. It believed that a suitable legal instrument on CBMs would offer the international community a convenient 'parking orbit' from which to seek to reach the final objective. The problem was one of judicious choice - which 'rules of the road' should be considered, and what 'code of conduct' should be contemplated first. From this point of view, Poland had no difficulty in supporting the course of action of this Committee which the Chairman had proposed in his paper CD/OS/WP.65.

"20. The delegation of the Russian Federation noted that the discussion in the Committee was already focusing to a large extent on the numerous available proposals on CBMs. It was suggested that the next logical step would be to take the course of action proposed by the Chairman in his paper CD/OS/WP.65. It was pointed out that all the justifiable concerns of the States regarding the specific aspects of the proposed CBMs would be taken care of in the course of future negotiations on the subject. The delegation also shared the view that the future mandate of the Committee should stipulate that CBMs are only a first step on the road to preventing an arms race in outer space, which remains a final goal of the Committee.

"21. The delegation of Sweden indicated that many useful and interesting proposals had been submitted concerning CBMs. Of special interest was the French proposal on prior notification of launchers of space objects and ballistic missiles. According to Sweden, this proposal had a vast confidence-building potential and deserved concrete treatment within the Committee. In its view, the time was now ripe to begin solid negotiations on CBMs, and therefore the Committee should have a negotiating mandate on this issue. This kind of mandate would be a reasonable compromise between no negotiations at all and all-encompassing negotiations. In this context, it felt that a mandate along the lines of the Chairman's proposal in his working paper CD/OS/WP.65 should be seriously considered.

"22. The delegation of Turkey, a non-member of the Conference on Disarmament, considered that the French proposal announced on 16 March 1993 was useful for reflection, but its application would depend on the existence of an efficient system of verification and would require universal participation for its functioning. Because of the absence of real sanctions in case of non-compliance, the system absolutely necessitated the participation of States possessing a system of detection and those who were able to launch ballistic missiles.

"23. There continued to be general recognition in the Ad Hoc Committee of the importance - and urgency as seen by the majority of the delegations - of preventing an arms race in outer space and the readiness to contribute to that common objective. The work of the Committee since its establishment in 1985 had contributed to the accomplishment of this task. The debates and the presentations made by experts at this annual session with the emphasis on confidence-building measures contributed to further identifying and clarifying a number of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was again recognition of the significant role that the legal regime applicable to outer space played in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, and of the need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness, and of the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. In the course of the deliberations, the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes was acknowledged. The Ad Hoc Committee also recalled the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which stated that 'in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies'. The Ad Hoc

Committee continued its examination of existing, and some new, proposals aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space to ensure that its exploration and use will be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the common interest and for the benefit of all mankind.

"24. In the context of the experts' contributions to the discussions on all aspects of the mandate and programme of work, the importance of the presentations in the Committee relating to confidence-building measures and to greater transparency and openness in outer space made in the course of the 1993 session was recognized by the Committee. Although cognizant of the various positions on these matters, the Committee also recognized the relevance of that discussion to the work of the Committee.

"25. In this regard the Chairman presented suggestions for the future work of the Ad Hoc Committee and its mandate as contained in document CD/OS/WP.65, proposing a negotiating mandate on CBMs. The majority of the delegations, while emphasizing that the scope of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee should not be narrowed and priorities in this field not altered, held the position that the Ad Hoc Committee should be given a negotiating mandate encompassing all relevant aspects of prevention of an arms race in outer space. A number of delegations shared and supported the view of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for the need to widen and change the nature of the present mandate to enable it to negotiate on CBMs. A few States, however, believed that the Ad Hoc Committee had still not yet identified any aspect of space activities which would lend itself to negotiations.

"26. The Committee noted the valuable and significant contribution to the discussions made by the experts from several delegations and expressed its appreciation to those delegations that provided contributions. The Committee equally voiced its appreciation of the work by the Friends of the Chairman and their organization of open-ended consultations on the issues of CBMs, terminology and other relevant legal aspects related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was wide agreement that the conclusion of an international agreement, or agreements, to prevent an arms race in outer space remained the fundamental task of the Committee, and the concrete proposals on CBMs could form an integral part of the said agreements.

"IV. CONCLUSIONS

"27. It was agreed that substantive work on all these issues should continue at the next session of the Conference. Therefore, it was recommended that at the beginning of the 1994 session, the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an appropriate mandate, taking into account the work undertaken since 1985."

E. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

38. The documents presented to the Conference during its 1993 session under the agenda item are contained in the report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee referred to in the following paragraph.

39. At its 665th plenary meeting on 3 September 1983, the Conference adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Committee re-established by the Conference under the agenda item at its 637th plenary meeting (see para. 6 above). That report (CD/1219) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

"1. At its 637th plenary meeting on 21 January 1993, the Conference on Disarmament decided to re-establish for the duration of its 1993 session an Ad Hoc Committee to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (CD/1121). This decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee required that the Committee would report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the annual session.

"II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS

"2. At its 640th plenary meeting on 2 February 1993, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Romulus Neagu of Romania as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. V. Bogomolov, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee.

"3. Between 5 March and 24 August 1993 the Ad Hoc Committee held 13 meetings. The Chairman also conducted informal consultations on specific concrete aspects of the agenda item, as well as several meetings with Group coordinators, and other representatives.

"4. In addition to the documents of the previous sessions, the following working papers were submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee:

CD/SA/WP.15	Compilation of Basic Documents relating to the Question of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons
CD/SA/WP.16	Chairman's Discussion Paper - Elements of a 'Common Formula' of Negative Security Assurances (NSA)
CD/SA/WP.17	Finland - Views on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

"III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK

"5. At the beginning of the annual session, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee conducted informal consultations with the delegations and the Group Coordinators to determine if the views of members had changed, as well as on the best way to address this item. Those consultations revealed that all delegations continued to attach importance to the agenda item and were ready to engage in a search for a mutually acceptable solution of the issue.

"6. During the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, various Groups and individual delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions, the detailed descriptions of which can be found in the previous annual reports of the Committee, related Conference documents and Working Papers, and Plenary Records.

"7. The Ad Hoc Committee held a series of official meetings and intensive informal consultations during which it addressed a number of issues related to negative security assurances.

"8. The following issues were raised by various delegations and were considered without prejudice to the respective positions of delegations:

"(a) The question of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States corresponding to the interests of the entire international community and contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and to the reinforcement of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

"(b) The appropriateness of a confirmation by nuclear-weapon States of positive assurances, together with negative assurances, as a follow-up to Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968;

"(c) The conclusion of negative security assurances in the form of a multilaterally negotiated treaty;

"(d) An agreement on a single common formula of negative security assurances as a contribution to the conclusion of such a treaty;

"(e) The question of exemptions in a common formula for negative security assurances;

"(f) A structure of a future treaty on negative security assurances;

"(g) Verification of a future treaty on negative security assurances; and

"(h) The relationship between security assurances and non-proliferation commitments.

"9. Many delegations continued to believe that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons was the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They believed that until the goal of nuclear disarmament was achieved on a universal basis, it was imperative for the international community to develop effective and unconditional measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter. Those delegations reaffirmed the need to find a common approach, acceptable to all, to be included in a multilateral agreement of a legally-binding character.

"10. Many delegations, members of the Group of 21, were of the view that the positions of most of the nuclear-weapon States had been found to be unsatisfactory in addressing the negative security assurances issue in a comprehensive manner, hence the calls on those nuclear-weapon States to review their positions. These delegations stressed that nuclear-weapon States had an

obligation to guarantee, in clear and categorical terms and in an international legally-binding form, that non-nuclear-weapon States would not be attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons. They underlined that the existing assurances and unilateral declarations fell far short of the credible assurances sought by non-nuclear-weapon States and in order to be effective, these assurances should be unconditional, without qualification, not subject to divergent interpretation and unlimited in scope, application and duration and based on a 'common formula' approach. In the view of these delegations, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter could not be invoked to justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence in the case of armed attack not involving the use of nuclear weapons, since nuclear war would threaten the very survival of mankind. Negative security assurances could not be predicated upon, nor could they be used as a pretext for demanding discriminatory obligations or 'reciprocal guarantees' from non-nuclear-weapon States.

"11. The delegation of India, while arguing that the only credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lay in the total elimination of such weapons, recognized the importance of negative security assurances. With regard to the conditions propounded for negative security assurances, the delegation stated that the United Nations Charter should not be invoked for use of nuclear weapons. The NPT is a discriminatory instrument which does not prevent the nuclear-weapon States from retaining or improving their nuclear arsenals. Similarly, nuclear-weapon States themselves are not, nor can they in future be a part of a nuclear-weapon-free zone without renouncing their nuclear weapons. Also, IAEA full-scope safeguards were again optional for the nuclear-weapon States. Accordingly, there was no rationale for imposing these conditionalities as a pre-requisite for negative security assurances.

"12. The delegation of Egypt noted that, as a result of the recent transformations and positive developments in the international political climate, there emerged an urgent need for nuclear-weapon States to review their unilateral security declarations in a comprehensive manner. It further noted that those non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT and/or to regional nuclear-weapon-free zones or who had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, were entitled to unconditional, legally-binding comprehensive security assurances which would not be limited in scope, framework or duration.

"13. The delegations of the Group of 21, States parties to the NPT, stressed that there was an urgent need for a multilateral agreement on NSAs, as progress on this issue would decisively influence the outcome of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

"14. The delegations of some other States parties to the NPT stressed that making the outcome of the 1995 Conference the hostage of any other development would endanger the whole Treaty.

"15. The delegation of Nigeria noted that the Committee this year was unable to break the impasse in the negotiations because of the lack of political will on the part of some nuclear-weapon States. Stating that there should be a spirit of give and take in the negotiations, Nigeria indicated that

nuclear-weapon States should not insist on imposing upon non-nuclear-weapon States a set of disparate, non-enforceable and unilateral declarations. It reiterated the main elements which could form a generally acceptable agreement (see CD/967 of 14 February 1990).

"16. The delegation of Kenya further stated that, with the change in the global political situation, it was not convinced of the need for any policy that envisaged the use of nuclear weapons. In its view, the circumstances at present would seem favourable for the conclusion of a Treaty on NSAs. Kenya wholeheartedly supported the review and extension of the NPT in 1995. It stressed that the following issues would receive priority in considering the period, or periods, by which the NPT should be extended: the conclusion of a Treaty on NSAs, the conclusion of a CTBT, the fulfilment of Article VI of the NPT, the halting of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes, as well as other issues related to nuclear disarmament.

"17. One delegation from the Group of 21 further stated that in its view the existing unilateral negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States were not legally-binding and, with the exception of the guarantee offered by the People's Republic of China, were not adequate. These assurances, therefore, needed to be improved upon, both in terms of their binding character and their scope. The delegation was also of the view that there should be a balance and reciprocity between the obligations of nuclear-weapon States and those of non-nuclear-weapon States. To enjoy legally-binding negative security assurances, non-nuclear-weapon States should make legally-binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons, i.e. they have to be States parties to the NPT, members of regional nuclear weapon-free zones, or have to make other forms of legally-binding commitments with full compliance with IAEA safeguards. Non-nuclear-weapon States who are not States parties to the NPT or other forms of legally-binding non-nuclear commitments should also be taken into account.

"18. The delegation of Hungary, stressing the weight of proliferation concerns, expressed its conviction that the NPT-regime would greatly benefit from real progress in the field of negative security assurances. Reiterating its preference for a multilateral, legally-binding instrument, it also pointed out that the attainment of the goal of creating a solid system of security assurances should not be prevented by disagreement on form, and other options could be considered as well. It underlined the function of legally-binding multilateral non-nuclear undertakings and full compliance with these undertakings in the process of defining the circle of potential beneficiaries of the system. It also expressed the view that the mere fact of being a member of a military alliance was irrelevant in the context of negative security assurances.

"19. A number of delegations addressed the issue of the responsibility of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, which had guided the Security Council to adopt its Resolution 255 in 1968. They supported the idea of a Security Council resolution on stronger assurances of solidarity and assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States in case of nuclear aggression.

"20. The delegation of France considered that the issue of negative security assurances was all the more important and complex in that it concerned at the same time compliance with commitments, non-proliferation and the protection of vital security interests. Several proposals had been put forward for the negotiation of a legally-binding agreement on this issue. However, in view of the reservations expressed in the Ad Hoc Committee about the reciprocal nature of the obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States on which such an approach would be based, it was the view of the French delegation that one of the possible avenues was to explore the possibility of a harmonization of the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States providing for balanced commitments and taking into account the requirements of non-proliferation and of the protection of security interests.

"21. Some delegations disagreed with the view that negative security assurances should be unconditional. They reaffirmed that one essential condition would always remain in place, i.e. that negative security assurances should be given only to the States which had themselves renounced the nuclear option.

"22. The delegation of Finland, a non-member of the Conference on Disarmament, was of the view that negative security assurances should be global in scope, uniform, unconditional and comprehensive, and that such guarantees should ensure the equality of all States that have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons through the NPT or other legally-binding multilateral instruments within the non-proliferation regime.

"23. The delegation of Germany offered some ideas on how to overcome the impasse in the negotiations. It suggested that solutions should be found to a number of issues, such as the assumption that renouncing the nuclear-weapon option required compensation as well as what might constitute an acceptable balance between the rights and obligations of non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States. It was also justified to put on the scale other relevant obligations and efforts undertaken by some nuclear Powers which were beneficial to all non-nuclear-weapon States, for example, security to their allies, an important role played by the same nuclear-weapon States in assisting the Russian Federation in destroying nuclear weapons safely, as well as a variety of efforts undertaken by the very same States to contribute to a development on the territory of the former Soviet Union which would not lead to additional nuclear Powers. Taking account of recent political developments, more emphasis should be given to broadening the basis of common understanding and updating arguments being used in the Ad Hoc Committee.

"24. In the framework of the debate on the legal value of the unilateral declarations issued by nuclear-weapon States, the delegation of Italy, quoting the 1974 judgement by the International Court of Justice in the nuclear tests case stated that, under international law, unilateral declarations might contain a binding obligation in so far as a clear commitment can be drawn by their wording.

"25. The delegation of China was of the view that the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States would be an important measure in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, prior to the realization of complete prohibition

and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It reiterated China's commitment that at no time and under no circumstances would China be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that China would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear weapon-free zones. It advocated negotiations on, and conclusion of, an international agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, and on the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

"IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"26. The Ad Hoc Committee reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament. The formal debates and informal consultations demonstrated the readiness of the delegations to continue the search for a common approach on the substance of negative security assurances. However, the complex nature of the issues involved, as well as, inter alia, differing perceptions of security interests continued to impede the work on the substance of the effective arrangements and the search for a common formula.

"27. Against this background, the Ad Hoc Committee continued to recognize the importance of the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and felt that there was a need to step up efforts in the light of recent transformations in the international political climate and other positive developments, to agree on a common approach, and to proceed to negotiations with a view to reaching agreement as stated in its mandate as soon as possible. Accordingly, there was an agreement on the recommendation that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session."

F. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons; Radiological Weapons

40. The Conference did not establish an ad hoc committee on this agenda item during the 1993 session. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the previous annual reports of the Conference, related official documents and working papers, as well as plenary records. The status of work on the agenda item is reflected in paragraphs 79-82 of the 1992 report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173).

G. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

41. The Conference did not establish an ad hoc committee on this agenda item during the 1993 session. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the previous annual reports of the Conference, in particular paragraphs 83-89 of the 1992 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173), related official documents and working papers, as well as plenary records.

H. Transparency in Armaments

42. The list of documents presented to the Conference during its 1993 session under the agenda item is contained in the report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee referred to in the following paragraph.

43. At its 665th plenary meeting on 3 September 1993, the Conference adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the Conference under the agenda item at its 637th plenary meeting (see paragraph 6 above). That report (CD/1218) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

"1. At its 637th plenary meeting, on 21 January 1993, the Conference on Disarmament decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments for its 1993 session with the following mandate (CD/1150 of 26 May 1992):

'The Conference on Disarmament, having considered the requests of the United Nations General Assembly included in its resolution 46/36 L, "to address, as soon as possible, the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including military holdings and procurement through national production, and to elaborate universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in this field; to address the problems of, and the elaboration of practical means to increase openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications and to weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with existing legal instruments; and to include in its annual report to the General Assembly a report on its work on this issue", and bearing in mind the time-frame established in paragraph 11 (b) of said resolution, decides to add to its agenda for its 1992 session an item entitled "Transparency in armaments", under which it can address those issues. The Conference on Disarmament further decides to include in its 1992 report to the United Nations General Assembly a section covering its work on this agenda item.

'The Conference also decides to address the agenda item in a series of informal meetings, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Zahran of Egypt.

'The Conference has taken due note of the request of the General Assembly to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in paragraph 11 (b) of resolution 46/36 L, to take into account the work of the Conference in his preparation of a report in 1994 on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register and its further development. Further, the Conference has also taken note of the request made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in paragraph 14 of the same resolution to provide the Conference all relevant information, including, inter alia, views submitted to him by Member States and information provided under the United Nations system for the standardized reporting

of military expenditures, as well as on the work of the Disarmament Commission under its agenda item entitled "Objective information on military matters".'

"II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS

"2. The Ad Hoc Committee held its first meeting on 19 March 1993 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Mounir Zahran, who had been appointed on 18 March 1993, at the 646th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Ms. Jenifer Mackby, Political Affairs Officer, Office for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee.

"3. The Ad Hoc Committee held 15 meetings from 19 March to 23 August 1993.

"4. In accordance with the decision of the Conference at its 603rd plenary meeting on 22 August 1991, the Ad Hoc Committee was open to all non-member States invited by the Conference, upon their request, to participate in its work.

"5. In addition to the documents of the previous session related to this item, the following official documents were submitted during the annual session:

(a) Document CD/1191 (also issued as CD/TIA/WP.3), dated 5 March 1993, submitted by the delegation of the People's Republic of China, entitled 'Letter dated 4 March 1993 from the Head of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a document entitled "Position of the Chinese delegation on Transparency in Armaments"'

(b) Document CD/1206 (also issued as CD/TIA/WP.11), dated 20 July 1993, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled 'Remarks made by Ambassador Michael Newlin: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs' on the field of export controls and conventional military equipment and technology

(c) Document CD/1207 (also issued as CD/TIA/WP.12), dated 20 July 1993, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled 'U.S. arms export system: policy, practices & contacts - September 4, 1992'

(d) CD/TIA/WP.4, dated 18 May 1993, Working Paper by the United States of America on an international data exchange of military holdings and procurement through national production

(e) CD/TIA/WP.5, dated 7 June 1993, Working Paper by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, entitled 'An Annual Declaration of the Size and Organization of Armed Forces'

(f) CD/TIA/WP.6, dated 8 June 1993, Working Paper by the United States of America on definitions of terms 'military holdings' and 'procurement through national production'

(g) CD/TIA/WP.7, dated 10 June 1993, Working Paper by Japan, entitled 'Proposal on the Elaboration of Universal and Non-Discriminatory Practical Means to Increase Openness and Transparency in Armaments'

(h) CD/TIA/WP.8, dated 10 June 1993, Working Paper by France on definitions of the terms 'military holdings', 'procurement through national production' and 'armed forces'

(i) CD/TIA/WP.9, dated 10 June 1993, Working Paper by France on the expansion of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to cover military holdings and procurement through national production

(j) CD/TIA/WP.10, dated 5 July 1993, Working Paper by Italy on measures to increase transparency

(k) CD/TIA/WP.13, dated 2 August 1993, submitted by Germany, entitled 'A Framework for International Data Exchange of Military Holdings and Procurement through National Production'

(l) CD/TIA/WP.14, dated 3 August 1993, Working Paper by Argentina on a supplementary register for weapons of mass destruction

(m) CD/TIA/WP.15, dated 13 August 1993, Working Paper by the Islamic Republic of Iran on transparency in armaments and the Conference on Disarmament

(n) CD/TIA/WP.16, dated 16 August 1993, Working Paper entitled 'Statement of Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Venezuela' on the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments

(o) CD/TIA/WP.17 and Corr.1, dated 16 August 1993, Working Paper by Italy, entitled 'Declaration of the conversion/closure of military production facilities'

(p) CD/TIA/WP.18, dated 18 August 1993, Working Paper by the Russian Federation, entitled 'International data exchange on military holdings and procurement through national production'***

(q) CD/TIA/CRP.2/Rev.3, dated 11 June 1993, entitled 'Timetable of Meetings'

(r) CD/TIA/CRP.3, dated 19 March 1993, entitled 'Programme of Work'

(s) CD/TIA/CRP.4, dated 29 July 1993, Conference Room Paper by Italy on the 'Symposium on Transparency in Armaments: the Mediterranean Region,' held in Florence, Italy

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*** It was agreed that this Working Paper would be discussed next year in the Ad Hoc Committee due to the fact that it was circulated after the substantive work of the Committee was completed.

(t) CD/TIA/CRP.5, dated 23 August 1993, entitled 'Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments'

(u) CD/TIA/INF.1/Add.2, dated 12 May 1993, entitled 'Background Paper pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 47/52 L and 46/36 L, "Transparency in Armaments"'

(v) CD/TIA/INF.2/Rev.1, dated 27 July 1993, entitled 'Statements made in the Conference on Disarmament during the first and second parts of its 1993 session on agenda item 8: Transparency in Armaments (CD/PV.636 - CD/PV.656: 19.01-25.03.1993 and 18.05-24.06.1993)'

(w) CD/TIA/INF.3/Rev.1, dated 24 August 1993, entitled 'Background Paper pursuant to document CD/1173'

"6. Following consultations on the organization of work, at its 2nd meeting, on 22 March 1993, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted the following Programme of Work for the 1993 Session:

'In accordance with operative paragraph 8 of General Assembly Resolution 47/52 L of 15 December 1992 which encourages the Conference on Disarmament to continue its work undertaken in response to the requests contained in paragraphs 12 to 15 of Resolution 46/36 L; and pursuant to the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments (CD/1180) for the 1993 session; the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments decides to adopt the following programme of work for 1993:

1. Examination of interrelated aspects, and elaboration of universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency related to:

a - excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms;

b - military holdings;

c - procurements through national production.

2. Addressing the problem of, and the elaboration of practical means to increase openness and transparency, in accordance with existing legal instruments, related to:

a - transfer of high technology with military applications;

b - weapons of mass destruction.

The Committee will address the above-mentioned issues with a view to examining any proposals and identifying areas of convergence, and will report to the Conference on Disarmament on its work before the conclusion of its 1993 session.'

"III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1993 SESSION

"7. Various countries reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions which they had put forth last year, the detailed descriptions of which can be found in the relevant section of the previous annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, related Conference documents, plenary records and working papers (CD/TIA/WP.1, dated 21 July 1992, submitted by Cuba, entitled 'Transparency in Arms Transfers' and CD/TIA/WP.2, dated 28 July 1992, submitted by France, on the Conference on Disarmament and transparency in armaments). Many countries expressed their views on the item in plenary meetings of the Conference throughout the 1993 session, as contained in its official records.

"8. It was agreed that an increased level of openness and transparency in the field of armaments may enhance trust and confidence among countries, help ease tensions and conflicts, promote stability and strengthen regional and international peace and security. Nevertheless, it was underlined that transparency is not an end in itself, nor is it to be pursued for its own sake. It was also agreed that transparency could contribute to restraint in production and transfers of arms, thus encouraging countries not to seek levels of armaments exceeding their legitimate security requirements and taking due account of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Transparency, coupled with restraint and responsible policies in arms transfers, increases confidence among countries and therefore enhances security and stability in the world. A gradual approach was advocated in the field of transparency in armaments in order to contribute to confidence building and security among countries.

"9. China put forward in CD/TIA/WP.3 its eight-point position of principle on transparency in armaments, which included, inter alia, that appropriate and practicable measures were conducive to the establishment and promotion of international trust and the easing of international tensions, and helped countries to decide upon appropriate levels of armaments; that specific transparency in armaments measures should be appropriate and practicable and formulated jointly by the countries concerned through consultations on an equal footing; that to promote transparency in armaments, countries should all strictly adhere to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and abide by the five principles of peaceful co-existence; and that since different countries and regions face different political, military and security conditions, it was not advisable to insist on superficially uniform transparency in armaments measures. Instead, countries should be allowed to opt for such measures as they deemed fit for their respective situation and conditions.

"10. A large number of countries expressed their views on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, stressing its importance and the fact that universal compliance with the requirements of the Register would be a confidence-building measure and would help identify irresponsible and destabilizing arms transfers. They considered the United Nations initiative on Transparency in Armaments, adopted in 1991 by the General Assembly with 150 votes in favour, none against and 2 abstentions, as an important international instrument for transparency.

"11. Argentina referred to the statement made before the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament by the President of Argentina, Dr. Carlos Menem, in which he described efforts aimed at enhancing the process of transparency in armaments as an important and stabilizing factor in international relations at both regional and global levels. President Menem recalled, in this regard, efforts and initiatives being carried out in this sphere in the Latin American region.

"12. Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Venezuela maintained, in CD/TIA/WP.16, that the mandate and Programme of Work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments derived from Resolution 46/36 L which set clear boundaries to its time-frame and scope. If there was a need for a review of the present mandate, such a review required a new decision of the General Assembly. They pointed out that there was a need to rationalize and streamline the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee must be solely developed with the aim of gradual expansion of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include all categories and types of arms, including weapons of mass destruction, their stockpiles, indigenous production and weapons undergoing research, development, testing and evaluation. This would help to maintain the delicate balance reached in setting up the Arms Register, whose future expansion to include other categories of armaments was a determining factor in the support given by some countries to Resolution 46/36 L. In this context, the above-mentioned countries also underlined the importance of avoiding multiplication or duplication of independent mechanisms in the field of transparency in armaments. They stated that progress on definitions of terms commonly used in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee was a necessary condition for advancing in its task. They pointed out that the achievement of any substantive and practical progress in this field could only be effective if there was agreement and common understanding on the meaning of the terms used.

"13. Many countries stressed that it was neither in the letter nor the spirit of Resolution 46/36 L to limit in time the mandate of the Conference on Disarmament or to restrict the scope of the tasks entrusted to the Conference in the field of transparency in armaments to questions related solely to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

"14. Australia, Japan and Sweden expressed the view that transparency measures needed to be developed in such a manner as to encourage the widest possible participation. In addition, they felt that if the scope of the Register was expanded too rapidly it could increase the technical difficulties involved with compiling data; thus it should be expanded gradually. Egypt supported the view of Japan that too much transparency might work against national security interests, but believed that this concern should not be used to exclude, a priori, certain categories of weapons from the exercise in transparency. Finland expressed the conviction that the agreed measures to increase openness and transparency had not compromised anyone's legitimate security needs. Sweden specifically suggested that under the category of warships the threshold should be lowered to about 100 tons. India specified that (a) expansion of the Register could be undertaken after a period of two years based on the implementation of the present Register; (b) besides the seven categories listed, other categories could also be included such as

electronic warfare systems, surveillance equipment, various types of helicopters, airborne warning and control systems (AWACs) and force multipliers; (c) format of production of data could be expanded; and (d) attention should be paid to the qualitative as well as quantitative aspects.

"15. Algeria, China and India questioned whether the United Nations Register would: prevent transfers by suppliers which would destabilize a country; serve to reduce excessive military expenditures by recipients; restrain in any manner the arms industries of the major arms suppliers; or reduce the large amount of military exports by the largest arms supplier countries, particularly to regions where tensions and conflicts exist. India stated that while there could be no definitive answers, much would depend on the image of the specific arms transfer, the nature of government and the relationship with its informed public. China emphasized that arms transfer registration must also help to stop interfering in other countries' internal affairs and threatening others' security through arms exports, and that further efforts were needed towards these goals.

"16. The United States proposed a draft decision urging all members and non-members of the Conference on Disarmament to provide the Register's requested data and information to the United Nations Secretary-General by 30 April annually, to begin in 1993, and inviting all members and non-members which submit data and information to the United Nations to exchange informally copies of their national submissions. Many countries supported this draft decision as a timely proposal which fitted well into the responsibility the Conference on Disarmament had been given by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 46/36 L. The Group of 21, while not addressing the substance of the proposal, announced that they would need more time to consider such a proposal. China pointed out that this issue should be addressed by the United Nations General Assembly.

"A. Excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms

"17. Argentina and Italy expressed the view that the question regarding the limit beyond which weapons were excessive concealed a variety of local, regional, cultural, and historical interpretations which would not be possible to unify. In addition, Australia, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States were of the opinion that it might be difficult for the Ad Hoc Committee to agree, at this stage, on an exact definition of what constituted an excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms or to distinguish that from what was a reasonable level of arms. Furthermore, they considered that the absence of such a precise definition would not prevent the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in developing practical and concrete measures to increase openness and transparency. Italy, in CD/TIA/WP.10, felt that a gradual approach of successive approximations (including responses to the United Nations Register) might yield an acceptable definition of the security of a nation at the lowest possible level of weapons. Other such measures towards building confidence might include periodic exchanges of military information, budgets, manoeuvres, equipment, control and verification of the data supplied to the Register.

"18. Algeria and Egypt believed the Committee should attempt to identify a common understanding of the relevant terminology of General Assembly Resolution 46/36 L such as 'excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms', and 'accumulations'. Egypt expressed the opinion that the defensive needs of each country within its regional context must be taken into account when considering the criteria of what constituted 'excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms'. Additionally, it felt that weapons of mass destruction were both excessive and destabilizing by their very nature.

"19. India stated that a closer examination of paragraph 12 of Resolution 46/36 L relating to the subject revealed that it left open the question of judgement as to who decides what was 'excessive and destabilizing'. Moreover, given the fact that military policies and systems of governments differ so widely throughout the world, this seemed to be a very difficult task.

"20. Various delegations agreed that although there was no definition of legitimate military power or what constituted excessive and destabilizing, Articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations Charter pointed to the proportionate use of armed force for defensive purposes. Argentina and the United States suggested that the London Guidelines for conventional arms transfers, adopted in October 1991, were a good starting point for building international consensus on common principles regarding what were good or bad arms transfers. Russia suggested utilizing the results of agreements in other fora, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Hungary suggested that the very purpose of openness and transparency should be to unveil inadmissible accumulations of arms in order to provide time for the international community to react appropriately to such irresponsible action. Such an 'early warning' function related to preventive diplomacy could be a new path for the international community.

"21. Nigeria suggested that the Ad Hoc Committee could agree on a number of factors, such as ratio of offensive weapons to defensive weapons, or percentages of military expenditures in national budgets, in order to arrive at what constituted a destabilizing and excessive accumulation of arms. Sweden thought that indicators such as yearly rates of increase in countries' military expenditures and the relation of such expenditures to countries' respective economic strength could be used.

"22. China held the view that efforts on transparency in armaments should focus on the exploration of and deliberation on the principles, concepts and definitions related to transparency in armaments, so as to lay the foundation for further work. It also believed that the first step should be to study the issue of excessive accumulation of arms. China felt that although definitions were difficult, it was still possible to establish standards by using indices such as the percentage of annual GNP devoted to military expenditure; military expenditure in terms of per unit area of a country's territory; number of soldiers per unit area of the territory; per capita annual military expenditure; and annual military cost for each soldier. Such indices, although not exhaustive, could help indicate excessive accumulations of arms without being detrimental to any country's security interests.

"23. France and the United States questioned the use and validity of such indices to determine what was excessive and destabilizing as they were not seen as capable of achieving the desired result. The United States expressed the view that one possible approach was to consider the matter in relation to military holdings and procurement through national production. Germany also suggested that the subject could be approached by adding weapons which are not included on the Register of Conventional Arms, as well as by including more detail for those that are, taking into account the confidence-building value and the administrative and political costs of such additions. It specifically suggested, with regard to the Register, lowering the tonnage threshold for warships, and, for some categories of weapons, a list and description, which could be revised, of known types of weapons for countries to use in categorizing their weapons.

"B. Military holdings and procurement through national production

"24. This topic provoked a great deal of discussion and a number of working papers. Many countries believed that the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of armaments posed a threat to national, regional and international peace and security, particularly by aggravating tensions and conflict situations. One way of addressing this problem was to highlight and examine countries' military holdings and procurement through national production. Italy suggested that the key to expansion of the Register lay in military holdings and procurement through national production. Japan pointed out the need to co[illegible] with the question of how to ensure non-discriminatory treatment between countries dependent on importing foreign arms and those whose arms requirements were met from indigenous production. Thus, in its view, openness and transparency ought to be applied to military holdings and procurement through national production as well as to arms transfers. Egypt noted the need to reach a common understanding on the meaning of the terms 'procurement' and 'national production' in order to avoid potential misunderstandings and obstacles in the future. With respect to 'national production', Egypt also raised the question of whether the various modes of production such as 100 per cent locally produced weapons, weapons that were jointly produced, weapons that were only assembled locally, etc. were all forms of 'national production'. Two proposals were made, by France and the United States, to establish an international data exchange of seven major categories of military holdings and procurement through national production (CD/TIA/WP.4 and CD/TIA/WP.9).

"25. The United States tabled CD/TIA/WP.4 as a practical means for increasing the level of openness and transparency in the field of armaments. The United States proposed an international data exchange in which countries would provide annually information concerning their military forces in seven equipment categories. Information would be comprised of total equipment holdings by category and total equipment accepted into service in the past twelve months through national procurement. The United States also submitted CD/TIA/WP.6 to be considered jointly with CD/TIA/WP.4. CD/TIA/WP.6 offered definitions for the terms 'military holdings' and 'procurement through national production'. The United States intended these two working papers to generate discussion and substantive work in the Committee and to highlight the important issues related to military holdings and procurement through national production.

"26. France submitted CD/TIA/WP.8 to be considered jointly with CD/TIA/WP.9. It proposed definitions of the terms 'military holdings', 'procurement through national production' and 'armed forces'. It was intended to facilitate the concrete work of the Ad Hoc Committee by attempting to avoid possible misunderstandings of the meaning to be given those terms. Working Paper 9 concerned the expansion of the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to cover 'military holdings and procurement through national production'. It proposed the exchange, on an annual basis (before 30 April each year), of available basic data concerning military holdings and procurement through national production. The information to be supplied should relate to the number of items in the seven categories of conventional arms presently included in the Register. The definitions to be used for each category were those mentioned in the Annex to resolution 46/36 L, as modified in the Report of the Secretary-General (A/47/342) endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 47/52 L. The available basic data to be exchanged annually should be supplied by disaggregating each category of conventional arms.

"27. Considerable debate and discussion followed the proposals made by the United States and France, which were supported by many countries. Some countries expressed concern over the mechanism for the reporting system for the independent data exchange, as proposed by the United States. The United States explained that since its initiative was a 'stand-alone' proposal, the Conference on Disarmament could engage in a substantive discussion on military holdings and procurement through national production. The United States believed that this discussion could help prepare the groundwork for the possible expansion of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, but, at the same time, not prejudice the work and conclusions of the 1994 group of governmental experts. Discussion revolved around definitions of terms such as leased equipment, armaments undergoing research, development, testing and evaluation, as well as modernization, 'accepted into service', licensing of production, the numbers of items and values. There was also an exchange of views on the detail of information to be provided and the degree of disaggregation.

"28. Sweden suggested the possibility that the format of such a data exchange could be negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament as a politically binding agreement to be made globally applicable subsequently by either integrating it into the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms or by submitting it separately to the United Nations General Assembly for approval. Sweden further expressed the view that including among the seven categories missiles and missile launchers could create security policy implications. Maintaining secrecy about the exact numbers and location of such systems was one important way for Sweden, as well as for other smaller countries not belonging to a military alliance, to secure a sufficient defence threshold against potential aggression.

"29. China and India were not able to support the establishment of an international data exchange on military holdings and procurement through national production and believed that further analysis of the initial results of the United Nations Register as well as further study of practicable criteria for determining what constituted excessive accumulation of arms would be advisable for the future. India stated that simultaneity and universality

were the key ingredients for the success of the Arms Register and while some Governments were in a position to provide the information on the above subject because of their own systems, it had reservations on this approach which was trying to upset the delicate consensus reached in setting up the arms register. India further said it was unlikely that data for the United Nations Register which included military holdings and procurement through national production would be conducive to a system of eventual verification which might come about as a result of specific disarmament agreements. Algeria, Egypt, India and Pakistan stressed the voluntary nature of the United Nations Register which would also extend to the expansion of it or another system of reporting. The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the view, in CD/TIA/WP.15, that military holdings were a major component in the possible expansion of the Register and should include holdings in other territories as well as military support commitments by other countries through bilateral or multilateral agreements and pacts. Further, Pakistan believed that the definition of military holdings ought to include indigenous production, existing stockpiles, leased equipment, improvement of functioning of existing equipment, as well as the next generation of military equipment.

"30. In CD/TIA/WP.13, Germany supported the contents of both the French and United States proposals. In order to promote consensus, Germany - on the basis of the proposal by the United States contained in CD/TIA/WP.4 - suggested broadening the framework for an international data exchange of military holdings and procurement through national production. The thrust of the proposal was to include all weapons and equipment under the control of the reporting country and to focus on numbers of items per category rather than aggregate value numbers. Thus Germany would like to enable as many countries as possible to participate in an additional process of confidence-building. While Germany advocated a data exchange within the framework of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, it argued that the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments might leave the technical issue of format for the data exchange to the 1994 group of governmental experts which would review the operation and development of the Register. Belgium, Hungary and Poland supported the proposal of Germany. Sweden held the view that the German proposal could present a practical way of addressing some of the questions of definitions. Japan expressed the view that the proposal of Germany, together with the proposals of the United States and France, were all in the right direction.

"31. Russia believed that though the exchange of data on military holdings and procurement through national production was essential, at the first stage the submission of relevant data should be voluntary. The data should be provided according to the seven categories of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in terms of the number of items per category. Russia did not agree with the proposals to include armaments and military equipment that were undergoing research, development, testing and evaluation in the data exchange. In this context, Russia presented CD/TIA/WP.18 containing concrete definitions of the terms 'military holdings' and 'procurement through national production'.

"32. A number of countries expressed the view that one of the most important interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms was information on armed forces personnel. In this connection, the

United Kingdom submitted CD/TIA/WP.5 on an Annual Declaration of the Size and Organization of Armed Forces. The United Kingdom noted that it was difficult to incorporate all the necessary interrelated aspects of transparency into one measure. A set of complementary measures may be required to help build up a picture of how United Nations Member States meet their legitimate defensive needs without causing mistrust and suspicion. An essential part of this picture was an armed force's capability in terms of its personnel and organization. The United Kingdom therefore proposed a simple annual declaration of the numbers of military personnel and the outline of their organization. Australia, France, Japan and the United States supported the proposal as a measure designed to strengthen transparency and complement other United Nations reports.

"33. This proposal generated discussion about definitions of, among other things, 'authorized personnel' and 'reserve status', and about location and change of location of armed forces. Finland considered that military holdings could be seen in a wider context of military capabilities together with such issues as troops, units and military structures.

"34. China expressed the view that conditions were not ripe for discussing those measures concerning the national possession and procurement of major weapon systems and the size, organization and deployment of armed forces, because given the current world situation and the concrete security environment of various countries and regions, should such measures be enforced on a global scale, it would enhance certain countries' already superior position while the security interests of many others would be compromised. Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Venezuela, in CD/TIA/WP.16, considered that Working Papers 4, 5 and 13 were not within the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. However, the United Kingdom, on behalf of the Western Group, countered that they were within the mandate. Several Eastern European countries expressed their support for the view of the Western Group.

"35. Japan introduced a proposal (CD/TIA/WP.7), on the elaboration of universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in armaments. It analysed the question of how to achieve 'non-discrimination' and 'universality' and also the relationship between these two concepts. Japan pointed out that: the scope of the measures should include not only the transfers of weapons, but also military holdings and procurement; the transparency in armaments operation must be simple and clear; and due consideration must be paid to each country's security concerns and flexibly meet specific regional needs. Japan proposed that: categories of weapons to which transparency in armaments operation is applied for military holdings and procurement do not necessarily have to be identical with those for arms transfers; supplemental transparency in armaments operations tailored to regional needs may be developed; and ways may be explored to utilize information made public by national Governments.

"36. Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Venezuela expressed the view that the issues of non-discrimination and universality were also relevant to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee which must be approached in a way which neither discriminated among countries nor among categories and types of arms.

"37. Sweden expressed the need to link the discussion about transparency in armaments with regional disarmament, and expressed the view that the Conference on Disarmament could play a more active role in this area. Algeria and Australia suggested the possibility of dealing with arms transfers not only on a multilateral level but on a regional level as well. Argentina stressed the importance confidence-building and transparency measures have at the regional level to defuse suspicion and misperceptions among countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the view, in CD/TIA/WP.15, that transparency in armaments was a confidence-building measure subject to specific military and geographic conditions of different regions. Iran believed that problems were abundant, however, in other regions, particularly where tensions and conflicts prevailed, and that therefore regional cooperation in the area of transparency in armaments should be encouraged, enhanced and strengthened through international assistance.

"38. Further, Italy suggested in CD/TIA/WP.17, as a useful practical means to increase transparency, the declaration of closure or reconversion to peaceful purposes of plants which have performed military production in the past.

"C. Arms transfers and transfer of high technology with military applications

"39. Various countries discussed their relevant national legislations on controls of export, import and transit of weapons materials and products of advanced technology with military applications. Argentina and Italy suggested compiling and comparing such existing laws and regulations and others on transfers of armaments, with a view to harmonizing respective legislation and existing agreements. France recalled its proposal (CD/TIA/WP.2) to pool and analyse information on national legislation and regulations and on export control procedures introduced by the supplier countries in order to facilitate a dialogue between suppliers and recipients of dual use technology. Italy invited members and non-members of the Conference on Disarmament who had adopted legislation on the subject to send such material to the United Nations, as it had done. Further, in CD/TIA/WP.10, it suggested establishing working groups or Friends of the Chairman to examine legal aspects and guidelines for national legislation, improvement of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and other measures to increase reciprocal confidence. Brazil suggested that a large number of countries participate in the elaboration of rules governing transfers and controls of dual use technology.

"40. Argentina, Poland, Romania, Ireland and Senegal suggested establishing agreed guidelines to serve as an international code of conduct to help control arms transfers and activities of weapons suppliers in accordance with universally applicable rules and standards. Romania further suggested that the overall aspects of transparency in armaments could be regulated through an international treaty which would set standards and procedures as well as appropriate implementation mechanisms. The United States made an expert presentation on export controls (CD/TIA/WP.11); presented a Working Paper on the United States arms export system: policy, practices and contacts (CD/TIA/WP.12); urged that the Conference on Disarmament promote restraint in arms exports and imports; and offered to assist others in creating the type of export control process and policy framework to prevent destabilizing transfers of conventional arms.

"41. China and Nigeria felt that countries with the largest and most advanced arsenals had the major responsibility to reduce their weapons exports, especially those of high technology, sophisticated and advanced weapons, and take the lead in making public information on their arsenals and force deployment, production and transfer of arms.

"42. India recalled paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the Jakarta Summit of the Non-aligned Countries which stated that growing restraints being placed on access to technology by the developed countries through imposition of ad hoc control regimes under the pretext of non-proliferation regimes impede the economic and social development of developing countries. India suggested, as a confidence-building measure, the elimination of the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Australia Group restrictions. China believed that, at present, there existed in the field of transfer of high technology various kinds of unjust and discriminative control and limitation against the developing countries. However, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States contended that export controls were a necessary complement to international agreements prohibiting transfers or the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and were designed to implement such commitments. Thus they stressed that these export controls contributed to preventing proliferation of these arms and were in no way intended to prevent the transfer of technology for development. At the same time, the Russian Federation favoured the discontinuation of the COCOM discriminatory practices with regard to Russia and the transformation of this regime into an instrument of constructive interaction of the international community for non-proliferation purposes. Russia also supported the idea of overcoming confrontation on the issue of export controls along the North-South axis through response actions by country suppliers of high technologies and recipient countries. Germany maintained that the parameters of Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention provided the solution to the problem, and suggested addressing the question of how transfers of high technology with military applications could be made transparent before tackling more far-reaching measures.

"43. The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the view, in CD/TIA/WP.15, that no provisions eventually agreed upon should by any means limit the availability of material, equipment and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes. All export control regimes outside the treaties and conventions in areas where they existed must be eliminated. In other areas, they should be made completely transparent, reduced to the minimum necessary level, and devoid of discrimination with the sole objective of enhancing international security at a lower level of armaments. These regimes should also be eliminated once internationally agreed arrangements came into being.

"D. Weapons of mass destruction

"44. Argentina proposed a supplementary register for the comparison of information obtained from the implementation of relevant treaties and agreements concerning weapons of mass destruction, CD/TIA/WP.14. The proposal of Argentina would consist of a consolidated report of already existing, publicly available information on the degree of implementation of multilateral and bilateral agreements dealing with weapons of mass destruction which, due to their characteristics, often include provisions whose fulfilment is

staggered in time. Thus, the Argentine proposal would aim at providing the international community with an official source of information on the actual situation concerning weapons of mass destruction subject to the terms of relevant agreements. Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Venezuela supported the Argentine proposal and welcomed, in principle, CD/TIA/WP.7 submitted by Japan. The United States found the Argentine proposal discriminatory, as it would only cover data on Russian and United States nuclear armaments, which was already publicly available, and therefore would not enhance the security of countries around the world. France recalled its proposals (CD/TIA/WP.2) related to possible measures, in conformity with international agreements, aimed at increasing transparency in the field of weapons of mass destruction.

"45. Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Venezuela expressed the view that the exclusion of certain categories or equipment could prejudice the work of the group of governmental experts to be convened in 1994.

"46. Nigeria expressed the view that, in conformity with the comprehensive and non-discriminatory character of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, it should not be limited to conventional weapons but must also include weapons of mass destruction. Canada, France and Russia stated that, due to the specificity of weapons of mass destruction and the international agreements applicable to them, differentiated measures of transparency should be sought for these arms. Therefore, these countries considered that it was not appropriate to call for the addition of weapons of mass destruction to the present United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. They also pointed out the fact that there were already global instruments in place prohibiting transfers or the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and considered that the international community should continue to seek universal adherence to these instruments. In this connection, Egypt reiterated that, pending the full implementation of the provisions of all global instruments relating to weapons of mass destruction, transparency in the field of weapons of mass destruction should be ensured.

"47. The United Kingdom stressed the need to address the question of conventional weapons rather than focus purely on weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the United Kingdom and the United States asked what practical means, besides the Argentine proposal, delegations were suggesting in order to increase openness and transparency related to weapons of mass destruction. Nigeria and Russia suggested establishing an exchange of data both on the quantity of fissionable materials which resulted from the destruction of nuclear weapons as they were being reduced and on their storage facilities.

"IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"48. The work of the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament covered a great amount of new ground. The Ad Hoc Committee conducted a substantive exchange of views on a number of complex issues surrounding the subject of transparency in armaments. Many suggestions and working papers were presented on a wide variety of topics, and several of them contained concrete proposals for practical measures to increase openness and transparency. Although agreement has not been reached on these proposals,

countries concurred that many of the issues contained therein were useful for future consideration and work to promote trust, confidence building and stability.

"49. In the light of the above, the Ad Hoc Committee therefore recommends that it be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament."

I. Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures

44. During its 1993 session, the Conference also had before it the following documents:

(a) Document CD/1174, dated 7 September 1992, submitted by the delegation of Argentina, entitled "Press release by the Argentine Government concerning the chemical weapons convention".

(b) Document CD/1187, dated 26 February 1993, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Letter dated 17 February 1993 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting an arms control and disarmament publication entitled 'Bibliography on Arms Control Verification: Update'".

(c) Document CD/1188, dated 26 February 1993, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Letter dated 17 February 1993 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a publication entitled 'The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Control of Scheduled Chemicals in Canada'".

(d) Document CD/1189, dated 26 February 1993, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Letter dated 17 February 1993 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a compendium of working papers of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons from the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament".

J. Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as Appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations

45. The annual report to the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as adopted by the Conference on 3 September 1993, is transmitted by the President on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mounir Zahran
Egypt
President of the Conference

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1223
16 September 1993

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 13 SEPTEMBER 1993, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL, TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ON THE "REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COORDINATOR OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FOR THE ISSUE OF EXPANSION OF ITS MEMBERSHIP"

As I was unable to be present at the last plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament for reasons beyond my control, I have the honour to attach herewith the text of the statement I intended to make on the report of the Special Coordinator on the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Conference (CD/1214) and the "clarification" provided (26 August 1993).

I would be grateful if you could have my statement circulated to the members and observers of the Conference as an official document.

(Signed): Luis C. de Barros
Deputy Permanent Representative

GE.93-62471 (E)

Statement by the delegation of Portugal to the Conference on Disarmament on the "Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Conference on Disarmament for the issue of expansion of its membership" (CD/1214) and the clarification of 26 August 1993

The Portuguese Government is fully aware of the problems and great sensitivity of the task of the Special Coordinator and thanks Ambassador O'Sullivan for the efforts he has made to find an equitable solution.

However, it seems to us that we have missed an excellent opportunity to give significant content to the universality factor which is now as decisive for the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament as other factors given priority in the report, especially the effectiveness of the CD's work and regional balance. At a time when the Conference on Disarmament is beginning to discuss new and sensitive matters, the importance of universality has, moreover, rightly been recognized by the qualified representatives of several member States (and observers) in the statements they have made in plenary.

The Portuguese Government thus believes that the proposed solution overestimates the criteria of regional and global balance and that, without making the work of the CD any less effective, a more equitable solution could also be achieved by accepting all countries which have requested membership.

This expansion would reflect the real international balance that has emerged as a result of the end of the cold war by avoiding decisions that penalize countries which have decided to take an active part in the CD.

Portugal states once again that it is very interested in rapidly becoming a full member of the Conference on Disarmament. It therefore takes note of the content of the "clarification" provided by Ambassador O'Sullivan on 26 August, especially with regard to the efforts that will have to be made, "as a follow-up to the present expansion", to deal with the situation of candidates not admitted during this phase of the proceedings.

We look forward to seeing what action will be taken in the short term with a view to the implementation of the recommendations made by the Special Coordinator.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1224
20 September 1993

ENGLISH
Original: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 10 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING AN INFORMATION NOTE ON THE MEASURES TAKEN BY IRAQ IN AUGUST 1993 PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations Office at Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva and has the honour to transmit herewith an information note on the measures taken by the Iraqi side in August 1993 pursuant to resolution 687 (1991).

The Mission hopes that the above-mentioned note will be distributed as a Conference document.

GE.93-62499 (E)

Information note on the measures taken by the Iraqi side in August 1993 pursuant to the requirements of resolution 687 (1991)

I. With regard to section C of resolution 687 (1991)

1. The Chemical Destruction Team (38)

The Team continued its work in a normal manner at the Al-Muthanna site. Since 18 June 1992, the Team has been supervising the operations undertaken by the Iraqi side to destroy chemical material at this site.

2. The Camera Installation Group

From 25 July 1993, the Group, headed by Eckhardt, continued its work at the Al-Rafah and Al-Yawm al-Azim sites. The Group left Iraq on 5 August 1993 after completing its work.

3. The Technical Team of the Special Commission

The Technical Team of the Special Commission, headed by the Russian Nikita Smidovich and consisting of 13 members, arrived in Iraq on 9 August 1993 and held a series of meetings with the competent Iraqi authorities concerning the use of a Russian reconnaissance aircraft. The Team also visited the Rashid airbase and a meeting was held between the Director of the Military Industrialization Organization and the Team leader. The Team left Iraq for Bahrain on 12 August 1993.

4. The Missile Team (62)

The Missile Team (62), headed by the American Kay and consisting of two inspectors, arrived in Iraq on 25 August 1993 and visited the Al-Yawm al-Azim and Al-Rafah sites and the Ibn al-Haitham Centre. On 30 August 1993, the Team attended an experimental inspection at the Al-Yawm al-Azim site. An explosion that occurred during the experiment caused a fire and destroyed the equipment and apparatus at the site, including one of the surveillance cameras that had been installed there.

5. The Aerial Reconnaissance Team

In August 1993, the Helicopter Unit of the Special Commission carried out the tasks assigned to it, with the collaboration of the Iraqi side which facilitated its operations. It flew 21 missions to transport the inspection teams to and from the sites to be inspected. The Aerial Reconnaissance Team also carried out 12 other missions in which 18 sites were reconnoitred, photographed and inspected.

6. The Nuclear Inspection Teams

None of these inspection teams were in Iraq in August. The Chairman of the Working Group at the International Atomic Energy Agency sent a number of letters, all of which were answered by the Iraqi side.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1225
5 October 1993

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 1 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE ON THE RECYCLING OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS AS WELL AS BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE RECYCLING OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES DEPLOYED IN UKRAINE, SIGNED ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1993

I have the honour to forward to you the texts of an agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the recycling of nuclear warheads, as well as basic principles governing the recycling of nuclear warheads from strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine, which were signed by the heads of government of the two countries in Yalta on 3 September this year.

Please take steps to ensure the distribution of the agreement and the basic principles as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): G. BERDENNIKOV

GE.93-62647 (E)

Agreement

between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the recycling of nuclear warheads

The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming the attachment of the Parties to the strengthening of the international regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the basis of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,

Taking into account the Treaty of 31 July 1991 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive arms, and the instruments associated with it,

Taking into account the agreement of 18 April 1992 between the Russian Federation and Ukraine concerning the procedure for the transfer of nuclear munitions from the territory of Ukraine to central locations in the Russian Federation for the purposes of dismantling and destruction,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purposes of the present agreement the terms set out below shall have the following meanings:

"Nuclear warhead" - the munition section of a weapon deployed in the territory of Ukraine, which contains nuclear materials in a single structure;

"Nuclear fuel for nuclear power stations" - material containing fissionable nuclides with a uranium-235 concentration of no more than 4.4 per cent, which, when placed in a nuclear reactor, makes possible a nuclear chain reaction;

"Highly enriched uranium" - uranium with a uranium-235 content of 20 per cent or more by weight;

"Low-enriched uranium" - uranium with a uranium-235 content of between 4.4 and 20 per cent by weight;

"Fuel assembly" - a cluster of fuel elements which form a whole and cannot be separated from one another on loading into the core of a reactor, irradiation and unloading;

"Fuel element" - an element of a fuel assembly consisting of the nuclear fuel itself and the fuel jacket, which ensures the safe transfer of heat from the fuel to the coolant;

"Recycling of nuclear warheads" - the process of dismantling, transport, storage and processing with a view to the use of nuclear warhead components for peaceful purposes.

Article 2

1. The Russian Federation shall ensure the recycling of all nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine.

2. The Russian Federation shall ensure that highly enriched uranium obtained as a result of the recycling of nuclear warheads is reprocessed into low-grade uranium, which shall be used to produce fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations in Ukraine or for other peaceful purposes.

Article 3

1. Fuel assemblies from the Russian Federation for nuclear power stations in Ukraine shall be supplied on the understanding that Ukraine will place its nuclear activities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

2. For the purpose of attaining the objectives set out in article 2 of the present agreement, the Parties shall conclude a contract. The contract shall be concluded within a period of six months following the entry of the present agreement into force. The Parties may as necessary conclude supplementary contracts in conformity with the present agreement.

3. In the event of any divergences between the present agreement and the contracts concluded in conformity with the present agreement, the provisions of the present agreement shall prevail.

Article 4

Each of the Parties shall designate implementing agencies for the application of the present agreement. For the Russian Federation the implementing agency responsible for the dismantling and transport of nuclear warheads shall be the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, while the implementing agency responsible for processing, storage and accounting shall be the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation; the agencies for Ukraine shall be the Ministry of Defence and the State Committee of Ukraine on the Use of Nuclear Energy. Each of the Parties shall have the right to replace the implementing agency by providing 30 days' notice in writing to the other Party.

Article 5

To ensure the implementation of the present agreement the Parties shall guarantee the unhindered entry and exit of personnel from the Parties and shall grant various reciprocal tax concessions which shall be subject to agreement between the Parties.

Article 6

1. The present agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of notifications by the Parties that they have fulfilled the domestic procedures necessary for the agreement's entry into force.

The present agreement, which shall apply in the context of the pertinent international obligations of the Parties, shall remain in force for 30 years. The period of validity of the present agreement may be modified by written agreement between the Parties.

2. The present agreement may be supplemented or modified by agreement between the signatory Parties.

3. The validity of the present agreement may be brought to an end one year after receipt of written notification to that effect by one of the Parties.

4. Done in Yalta on 3 September 1993 into two copies, each in the Russian and Ukrainian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the Russian Federation

V. Chernomyrdin

For the Government of Ukraine

L. Kuchma

Basic principles

for the recycling of nuclear warheads from strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine

The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, have agreed on basic principles for the recycling of nuclear warheads from strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine:

1. Dismantling and transport

(a) The Parties shall guarantee conditions for removal by the Parties of all types of nuclear warheads from ICBMs and the transfer of these warheads, and also front sections from nuclear ALCMs, to the territory of the Russian Federation with a view to dismantling and recycling.

(b) The implementing agencies of the Parties shall cooperate in the removal, transport and storage of these warheads, and shall be guided by the provisions of the 1992 agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation concerning the procedure for the transfer of nuclear munitions from the territory of Ukraine to central locations in the Russian Federation for the purposes of dismantling and destruction.

(c) The Parties shall guarantee security in the process of the operation and removal of nuclear warheads from the missiles and their transport in accordance with current technical requirements and standards regarding nuclear weapons. In this regard, the transport of the nuclear warheads shall be effected by and at the expense of the Russian Party. The Ukrainian Party shall be responsible for ensuring secure conditions for the movement of nuclear warheads on its territory.

(d) Operations for the implementation of paragraph 1 shall be effected in accordance with a schedule to be drawn up by the Parties and confirmed by their heads of government. Account shall be taken of the need to dismantle first of all nuclear warheads for which the time-limit for the use or storage of munitions and individual components has already passed. Compensation for each nuclear warhead removed from Ukraine to the Russian Federation shall be effected within one year after the date on which the warhead crosses the border between the Parties.

2. Procedure for reimbursing the value of nuclear materials

(a) All the highly enriched uranium (approximately 50 metric tonnes) removed from nuclear warheads under the present agreement shall be reprocessed in the Russian Federation into low-grade uranium.

(b) The principles governing accounting for such uranium shall include the following:

(b) (1) Neither of the parties shall subsidize the other.

(b) (2) No profit, no loss.

(b) (3) Prices and expenses to take account of inflation and changes in the world market.

(b) (4) The Russian Federation shall deliver to Ukraine fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations. Compensation for expenses incurred by the Russian Federation in supplying the assemblies for Ukraine shall be made through the sale of uranium extracted from strategic nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine.

(c) Weapon-grade plutonium extracted from strategic warheads deployed in Ukraine shall be stored in the Russian Federation until such time as the Parties adopt a decision on its recycling.

Ukraine shall receive the value of the weapon-grade plutonium as it is sold, less costs and expenses incurred by the Russian Federation in recycling it.

(d) Non-nuclear components of strategic nuclear weapons extracted from nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine shall be recycled on terms to be agreed by the Parties.

(e) The Parties shall ensure transparency as regards accounting for the nuclear materials and their value in their activities under (a), (b) (4) and (c).

(f) Fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations in Ukraine shall be supplied on the basis of annual contracts between the implementing agencies of the Parties.

(g) In cases where uranium extracted from warheads located on the territory of Ukraine is sold on the world market, tripartite agreements may be concluded guaranteeing that the Parties will receive appropriate shares of the value of the products.

The validity of the present basic principles shall be the same as that of the agreement of 3 September 1993 between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine concerning the recycling of nuclear warheads.

For the Government of the Russian Federation

V. Chernomyrdin

For the Government of Ukraine

L. Kuchma

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1226
5 October 1993

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 2 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PRESS RELEASE AND A STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION RELATED TO THE ISSUE OF THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE

I am sending you for information a press release dated 21 September 1993 and a statement by a representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 1 October, relating to the issue of the elimination of nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine.

I would be most grateful to you if these documents could be distributed to delegations of member States of the Conference and observer States.

(Signed): V. ZEMSKOV
Deputy Representative
of the Russian Federation
on the Conference on
Disarmament

GE.93-62653 (E)

PRESS RELEASE

The 9 September 1993 issue of the newspaper Kievskie Vedomosty carried a photocopy of the "Protocol on the withdrawal to the Russian Federation of all nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine".

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is authorized to state the following in this respect.

During the meeting in Massandra on 3 September this year between the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine, it was agreed that all nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces which are deployed in Ukraine will be withdrawn to Russia no later than 24 months after the date of ratification of the START-1 Treaty by Ukraine. The substance of this agreement, as can be seen from the photocopy, is reflected in the title of the document, which includes the word "all". The Presidents decided that the document would be of a confidential nature and would bear the signatures of their heads of government. Moreover, the Prime Ministers signed a prepared document which reads as follows:

> "The President of the Russian Federation and the President of Ukraine have agreed that after ratification of the START-1 Treaty by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine the Government of Ukraine will, no later than 24 months after the date of ratification, ensure the withdrawal of all nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine to the Russian Federation for dismantling and destruction."

However, A.D. Buteiko, an adviser to the Ukrainian President, taking advantage of the fact that the documents passed through his hands after being signed by the head of the Ukrainian Government, L.D. Kuchma, made two handwritten corrections to the text, changing the substance of the agreement entirely. These corrections are clearly visible in the copy published in Kiev: the word "all" is crossed out and the words "subject to the Treaty" are added after the words "strategic nuclear forces". These amendments in fact signify that Ukraine, or in this case a certain group in the government apparatus, is striving to retain some of the nuclear weapons in Ukrainian hands in defiance of Ukraine's international obligations.

In spite of a high-level protest from the Russian side, Ukrainian representatives refused to restore the original language. Given this behaviour by the Ukrainian side, which is to say the least unusual in diplomatic practice, the Russian side officially invalidated this Protocol and immediately notified the Ukrainian representatives accordingly.

Thus the "Protocol on the withdrawal to the Russian Federation of all nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine" is non-existent. This, of course, does not affect the substance of the agreements reached by Russia and Ukraine at the level of heads of State and government.

STATEMENT BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As is well known, on 3 September 1993, during the meeting between the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Massandra, historic agreements were achieved regarding the elimination of all nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine. The agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the recycling of nuclear warheads, as well as the basic principles governing the recycling of nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces stationed in Ukraine, associated with this agreement, were signed by the heads of government of both countries and published in the press. Moreover, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine agreed that after ratification of the START-1 Treaty by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, the Government of Ukraine will, no later than 24 months after the date of ratification, ensure the withdrawal of all nuclear warheads from the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine to the Russian Federation for dismantling and destruction.

Nobody has cancelled or repudiated these agreements. This was stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia on 21 September. Yet we believe that it is necessary to draw this to the attention of the international community once again, in view of the fact that a racket has recently been raised in some of the media, partly at the prompting of certain Ukrainian officials, with the transparent purpose of calling into question the agreements on nuclear weapons reached between the President of the Russian Federation and the President of Ukraine. All the evidence indicates that this is being done by those in Ukraine who are displeased with the actions and decisions of their own President and wish to cancel the results achieved in Massandra.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to state that all the agreements reached in Massandra regarding nuclear weapons remain fully in effect. The task now is to begin their practical implementation as soon as possible. Russia stands ready to do so.

1 October 1993

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1227
13 October 1993

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 11 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE CONCERNING THE NUCLEAR TEST CARRIED OUT BY CHINA

I have the honour to request you to circulate as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament the following statement by the Government of Chile:

"The Government of Chile has learned of the decision of the Government of the People's Republic of China to detonate a high-yield nuclear device at the Lop Nor testing site in the western province of Xinjiang. Although smaller than the test carried out by China in May 1992, this test involved a yield five times that which destroyed the Japanese city of Hiroshima at the end of the Second World War.

"Chile deplores this decision, which interrupts the voluntary moratorium that had been initiated and places pressure on other nuclear Powers which might reconsider their positions, leading to a return to a nuclear testing race which appeared to have been rendered obsolete by new approaches to security.

"The Government of Chile hopes that the test carried out by the People's Republic of China will be the last of its kind and that there will be no return to a race to upgrade nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The only way to create the climate of trust necessary to speed up the disarmament negotiations to be held in Geneva, with the aim of securing a ban on nuclear testing once and for all, is to ensure that all the nuclear Powers fully shoulder the responsibility incumbent on them not to continue such tests, which are repudiated by the moral conscience of the international community."

(signed): ERNESTO TIRONI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1228
25 October 1993

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT OF THE PRESS CENTRE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1993

I have the honour to forward to you the attached Statement of the Press Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine dated 24 September 1993.

I would be most grateful if, in accordance with established procedure, this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all delegations, both member States, non-member States, participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) OLEXANDR SLIPCHENKO
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of Ukraine

PRESS-STATEMENT

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation issued the Press-Statement on the occasion of the denunciation of the "Protocol on the removal to the Russian Federation of all nuclear warheads located in Ukraine " signed on 3 September this year, referring to the fact, that the photocopies of this document recently published in the newspaper "Kievskiye vedomosti" bore well noticeable corrections made by hand, which allegedly changed completely the content of the agreement.

In connection to the abovementioned the Press-Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is authorized to state the following.

Contrary to the usual diplomatic practice, members of the Russian delegation submitted to the Prime-Ministers of Ukraine and Russia for signing the version of the text differing from the one discussed and agreed upon by the experts of the delegations.

Since the text submitted for signing contained provisions contradicting the national interests of Ukraine, representatives of the Ukrainian side made the abovementioned corrections in the presence and with agreement of the representatives of Russia. The Russian side did not make any objections or protests. Due to technical reasons the document was not re-typed .

It is astonishing that the Press-Statement of the MFA of the Russian Federation maintains that the Russian side annuled this Protocol immediately, of which act the representatives of Ukraine were allegedly informed. This does not correspond to reality absolutely. It is not clear, why in this case the Russian side needed 14 days to make the statement on the denunciation of the Protocol and why the state, as influential as Russia, has chosen for this such an unusual for diplomatic practice a method as the press-statement.

The Ukrainian side regards the mentioned Press-Statement as lacking objectivity, distorting real events and amounting to an awkward attempt of unfounded discredit of one of the members of the Ukrainian delegation.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1228*
28 October 1993

Original: ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 22 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE PRESS RELEASE OF THE PRESS-CENTRE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1993

I have the honour to forward to you the attached press release of the Press-Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine dated 24 September 1993.

I would be most grateful if, in accordance with established procedure, this press release could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all delegations both member States and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) OLEXANDR SLIPCHENKO
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of Ukraine

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

GE.93-62691 (E)

PRESS RELEASE

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation issued the press release on the occasion of the denunciation of the "Protocol on the withdrawal to the Russian Federation of all nuclear warheads ... deployed in Ukraine" signed on 3 September this year in Crimea, referring to the fact that the photocopy of this document recently published in the newspaper "Kievskiye vedomosti" bore well noticeable corrections made by hand, which allegedly changed completely the content of the agreement.

In connection with the above-mentioned the Press-Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is authorized to state the following.

Contrary to the usual diplomatic practice, members of the Russian delegation presented to the Prime Ministers of Ukraine and Russia for signing the version of the text differing from the one discussed and agreed upon by the experts of the delegations.

Since the text presented for signing contained elements which did not correspond to the national interests of Ukraine, representatives of the Ukrainian side made the above-mentioned corrections in the presence and with agreement of the representatives of Russia. The Russian side did not make any objections or protests. Due to technical reasons the document was not retyped.

It is astonishing that the Press Release of the MFA of the Russian Federation maintains that the Russian side officially annulled this Protocol immediately, of which act the representatives of Ukraine were allegedly informed. This does not correspond to reality absolutely. It is not clear, why in this case the Russian side needed 14 days to make the statement on the denunciation of the Protocol and why the State, as influential as Russia, has chosen for this such an unusual method in diplomatic practice as the press release.

The Ukrainian side regards the mentioned press release as lacking objectivity, distorting real events and amounting only to an awkward attempt of unfounded discredit of one of the members of the Ukrainian delegation.

PRESS-CENTRE OF THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE

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